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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
SPEED, SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS‟ INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS 
 
 
 
FİRUZE SİMAY SEZGİN 
 
 
M.A. Thesis, 2015 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Kerim Can Kavaklı 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: United Nations, peacekeeping, personnel contribution, deployment 
promptness, composition. 
 
 
 
 
The first few months of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are critical 
stages for achieving stable peace, and the speed, size, and composition of the initial 
deployments have a vital importance for the UN to signal its commitment to the 
mission. This thesis is the first systematic analysis on the factors that determine the 
speed of forming resolutions and deployments, initial contribution levels, and 
composition of the UN peacekeeping operations.  
We collected original data on the UN peacekeeping operations. We tested hypotheses 
drawn from Realist and Liberal theories of international relations. We find that self-
interest of the contributing countries do not increase the contribution rates or accelerate 
the deployment process, but the conflicts that pose a threat to international security are 
more likely to receive quicker deployments. 
For the Liberal accounts, we find that democracies contribute more than non-
democracies. Recipient countries with long-standing intense conflicts are more likely to 
receive slower formed resolutions and slower deployments with lower participation 
rates. However, as a new measure to the literature, if a recipient country experiences a 
spike in deaths prior to the establishment of the operation, then this humanitarian crisis 
leads countries to contribute more with a prompt deployment. 
As a geographical factor, contributions to the operations decrease with the increase in 
distance between contributor and recipient countries. Lastly, the operations established 
after the Brahimi Report (2000) are more likely to receive faster formed resolutions and 
increased initial contributions mainly from non-democracies with prompt deployments.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER BARIŞI KORUMA OPERASYONLARI BAŞLANGIÇ 
KONUŞLANDIRMASININ HIZI, BOYUTU VE KOMPOZİSYONU 
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Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) barışı koruma operasyonlarının ilk birkaç ayı istikrarlı barışı 
sağlamak için kritik süreçlerdir, ve ilk konuşlandırmanın hızı ve boyutu BM‟nin 
kararlılığını göstermekte çok önemlidir. Bu tez, BM barışı koruma operasyonlarının 
çözümünün oluşturulma ve konuşlandırmanın hızını, ilk katkıların düzeylerini ve 
kompozisyonunu belirleyen faktörler üzerine ilk sistematik analizdir. 
BM barışı koruma operasyonlarının orijinal verilerini topladık. Uluslararası ilişkilerden 
alınmış Realist ve Liberal teorileri test ettik. Katılımda bulunan ülkelerin çıkarlarının 
katılımlarını fazlalaştırmadığını ve de konuşlandırma sürecini hızlandırmadığını, fakat 
uluslararası güvenliğe tehditte bulunan çatışmalara daha hızlı konuşlandırma 
yapılmasının olasılığını daha yüksek bulduk.  
Liberal ele alışlar için ise, demokrasilerin demokrasi olmayanlardan daha fazla 
katılımda bulunduğunu bulduk. Uzun zamandır süren şiddetli çatışmaları olan alıcı 
ülkeler büyük olasılıkla yavaş oluşturulan çözümler ve az katılım oranı olan yavaş 
konuşlandırmalar alacaktır. Fakat, literatürde yeni bir ölçü olarak, operasyonun 
kuruluşundan önce alıcı ülkeler çatışmayla alakalı ölümlerde hızlı bir artış yaşarsa, bu 
insanlık krizi ülkelerin daha fazla katılım yapmasını ve daha hızlı konuşlandırmasını 
sağlar.  
Coğrafi bir faktör olarak, katılımcı ve alıcı ülkeler arasındaki mesafe uzadıkça 
operasyonlara katılım azalır. Son olarak, Brahimi Raporu‟ndan (2000) sonra kurulan 
operasyonların daha hızlı oluşturulan çözümlere ve çoğunlukla demokrasi olmayan 
ülkelerin katılımlarıyla daha fazla katılım alma ve daha hızlı konuşlandırma olasılığı 
daha yüksektir.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 The United Nations peacekeeping operations have been one of the preferred 
tools to help create sustainable peace in countries that are torn by conflict. Since its 
establishment, the United Nations (UN) has undergone a series of transformations and 
changes in visions. These reforms, which were constituted through lessons learned 
from the previous operations, led UN to mostly apply multidimensional peacekeeping 
instead of traditional peacekeeping in recent decades. Today‟s multidimensional 
peacekeeping encompass maintaining peace and security, humanitarian causes such as 
protecting civilians and promoting human rights, assisting in restoring the rule of law, 
and facilitating political process (Fortna, 2008; Daniel, 2013). With multidimensional 
peacekeeping, the UN peacekeeping operations came to be regarded as successful and 
effective in many respects (Bellamy and Williams, 2010; Fortna, 2008; Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2000). 
 Scientific research on UN peacekeeping operations show that peacekeeping 
operations matter for many outcomes. First of all, as Fortna (2004) indicates, 
peacekeeping operations‟ most costly and important task is to create durable peace 
that is self-sustainable without the peacekeepers on field. Most of the recent 
peacekeeping scholars, such as Fortna (2004, 2008), and Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 
2006), have reached a consensus on the fact that peacekeeping operations are 
effective in many respects and they increase the duration of peace after civil wars. 
However, scholars have not reached an agreement regarding peacekeeping‟s effect on 
democratization and war duration. Although there are various contestations and gaps 
among the literature, one major finding is that, even though the UN tends to deploy its 
missions to difficult conflicts, the UN peacekeeping operations have a positive impact 
on the duration of peace (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004, 2008).  
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 Research also shows that the size and composition of peacekeeping operations 
matters. The UN, as a credible intervening third-party, signals credible commitment 
through deploying a great number of peacekeeping personnel (Holt et al., 2009). In 
addition, the amount of troop personnel and duration of peace after a civil war are 
positively correlated (Hultman et al., 2013).  
 Initial deployment of UN peacekeeping operations is still an open question in 
the peacekeeping literature and this research aims to fill this gap by revealing the 
factors that determine the speed and size of initial UN peacekeeping operations‟ 
deployments. Unlike most of the literature that focuses solely on troop contributions, 
this study examines all contribution types, which are troop, police, military observer, 
and expert. Also, as another new focus in this research, we take into account both the 
delay of deployment and the duration of forming of a resolution after the 
peacekeeping operation is suggested. With these aspects at hand, this thesis will be 
the first systematic analysis of deployment and resolution speeds, and initial 
contribution levels of the UN peacekeeping operations.  
The research question at hand is crucial for the UN peacekeeping operations, 
because as it is indicated by the UN, “the first few months after a cease-fire or peace 
accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and bolstering the 
credibility of a new operation” (2008, p. 62). In other words, the first few months of 
the operations are critical stages for achieving stable peace after the UN forces leave 
the field. By solely examining initial deployments, this research will reveal the trends 
in contribution and deployment to the UN peacekeeping operations and present how 
the peacekeeping operations can be developed from deployment and contribution 
perspectives.  
In order to present what affects and determines the speed of forming 
resolutions and deployments, and initial contribution levels, we tested Realist-inspired 
arguments and Liberal accounts of the peacekeeping operations by depicting both 
previously studied variables and our novel variables to the literature. As our method, 
we used ordinary least squares regression analysis to estimate the relationship 
between these variables, and predict both the UN and the contributing countries‟ 
actions.  
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For these purposes, we collected data on UN peacekeeping operations through 
UN‟s monthly released factsheets for deployment numbers and dates, and we only 
collected the initial deployment numbers from the UN peacekeeping operations‟ 
factsheets. We collected the time passed between suggestion, authorization, and 
deployment for every mission. We only cover post-1990 period because the number 
of UN peacekeeping operations has increased immensely, the data on deployment can 
be publicly accessed, and with the ending of the bipolar Cold War, it is possible to 
assume an ideal setting where all the countries can participate without political 
obstacles.  
 Starting with Realist-inspired hypotheses, we find that self-interest of the 
contributing countries do not increase the contribution rates or accelerate the 
deployment, and the conflicts that pose a threat to international security are more 
likely to receive quicker deployments. Secondly, we tested Liberal account of the UN 
peacekeeping operations, which argues that democratic states are more likely to 
participate in interventions. By testing liberal theory through democracies‟ 
contribution rates and deployment promptness, we find that democracies contribute 
more than non-democracies, but we could not reach a significant result for their 
deployment promptness.  
We then proceed with testing the conflict intensity‟s effect on our variables, 
which is also a test for humanitarian argument of longer and more deadly conflicts 
being more likely to receive intervention from deployment and quickness perspective. 
Although the fear of potential spillover increases the contribution rates of the 
geographically proximate countries, intense conflicts that are long-standing with high 
battle-related deaths are more likely to receive slower formed resolutions and slower 
deployments coupled with lower participation rates. However, we find support for the 
humanitarian argument with our novel measure in the peacekeeping literature. If a 
recipient country experiences a spike in battle-related deaths prior to the 
establishment of the peacekeeping operation, then the humanitarian crisis created by 
the sudden increase in deaths forces countries to initially participate more with a 
prompt deployment.  
We then tested other relevant factors that determine the speed and size of 
initial UN peacekeeping operations‟ deployments. We significantly find that increase 
of the recipient country‟s area corresponds to an increase in authorized personnel 
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number, but the population of the recipient country does not have any significant 
effect. We also tested if the first peacekeeping operations or the follow-up ones that 
are repeatedly established for the same conflict at the same recipient country received 
more contributions, and we find that follow-up operations‟ fulfilled mandate 
percentages are more than the firstly established ones. We hypothesized that regions‟ 
democratic compositions reflect UN peacekeeping operations‟ contributions, but we 
could not find support for this argument.  
Lastly, we tested what has changed after the Brahimi Report‟s suggestions for 
more efficient and successful UN peacekeeping operations (Bellamy et al., 2010). We 
find that the newly established peacekeeping operations are more likely to receive 
faster formed resolutions and higher initial contribution rates with prompt 
deployments. We also find that the nature of UN troop contributing countries shifted 
in the 21
st
 century with respect to receiving initial deployments more from democratic 
to non-democratic countries. Therefore, we present an optimistic future vision of the 
UN peacekeeping operations with higher contribution rates, faster deployments, and 
more complex missions with a broad spectrum of goals to achieve. 
 An important implication of this research is that it reveals UN peacekeeping 
operations‟ trends in deployment and contribution rates, how different democracy 
levels are inclined to act, and what has changed after the Brahimi Report. In addition, 
this research offers a policy contribution by stating that quick deployment, and 
deploying large numbers of troops signal credible commitment to the insurgents, and 
consequently lead the UN to show willingness in maintaining peace and security in 
the post-civil war period.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds first with a literature review on related topics of 
the UN peacekeeping operations. We then elaborate on the theories of peacekeeping 
operations and generate our testable hypotheses under the theoretical framework 
section. Afterwards, we discuss our data and methodology, and present our results. 
The final section concludes with providing the implications of this thesis and the ways 
for future research.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
The literature on the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has 
proliferated significantly in recent decades. Although the literature has grown into 
thematic strands, this literature review will only focus on some of the relevant major 
topics, which are the UN peacekeeping operations‟ effect on peace, democratization, 
and war duration. Lastly, the effect of size and composition of the UN peacekeeping 
operations will be discussed.  
 
 
 
2.1. Peacekeeping Operations’ Ability to Maintain Peace 
 
 
 
One major argument among the scholars is the UN peacekeeping operations‟ 
effect on peace. Peacekeeping operations‟ most costly and important task is to create 
durable peace that is self-sustainable without the peacekeepers on field (Fortna, 
2004). As Fortna (2004) indicates, “true success is not just preventing another war, 
but the ability to go home and still have peace hold; to create a self-sustaining peace” 
(p. 284). Since this issue has an utmost importance and it is basically the reason for 
the establishment of the UN peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping operations‟ effect 
on peace is an overwhelmingly studied topic in the peacekeeping literature. 
On the one hand, several case studies have found peacekeeping operations as 
ineffective in their tasks (e.g. Jett, 1999; Jones, 2001; Diehl, Reifschneider, Hensel, 
1996). On the other hand, most of the recent peacekeeping scholars like Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000, 2006), Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2005), Fortna and Howard 
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(2008), Fortna (2004, 2004b, 2008), Walter (1997, 2002), Haas (1986), Hartzell, 
Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), and Gilligan and Sergenti (2007) have tested UN 
peacekeeping operations‟ effectiveness with different datasets and methods, and they 
jointly reached a different conclusion. These scholars have agreed upon the fact that 
the UN peacekeeping operations are effective in their tasks, and these operations are 
successful in increasing the duration of peace after civil wars. As stated by Fortna 
(2008, p. 116), in fact, if peacekeepers are deployed to the field, peace is at least 55%-
60% more likely to last.  
As Fortna (2003) indicates, “peacekeeping does contribute to more stable 
peace and suggest, …, that peacekeeping is no less effective at keeping peace between 
belligerents in civil wars than between sovereign states” (p. 98). Therefore, it is not 
just civil wars that the UN peacekeeping operations are successful in, but they are also 
successful in creating stable peace in interstate conflicts. So, even though the UN 
tends to deploy its missions to difficult conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations have a 
positive impact on the duration of peace (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004, 
2008). 
Gilligan and Sergenti (2007) state that, “in theory, peacekeepers fill the gap in 
the transitional period following a civil war until trust can be reestablished and self-
enforcing domestic political institutions can take over” (p. 7). During the transitional 
period, Fortna (2004b) poses the questions of how and why peacekeeping works in 
establishing stable peace. As Walter (1997, 2002) and Fortna (2004b) specify, in post-
conflict peacekeeping operations, a special emphasis is given to the monitoring of 
disarmament. In addition, Fortna (2004b) provides a systematic argument on 
enhancing stable peace through four mechanisms. First of all, peacekeepers can 
increase the benefits of peace while raising the cost of returning to war. Secondly, 
peacekeepers can reduce uncertainty by monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. 
Thirdly, peacekeepers can prevent certain triggering events that may lead to a return 
to warfare. Lastly, peacekeepers can prevent abuses that may arise through the 
reconstruction of the political sphere. Other main arguments for the important aspects 
in forming self-sustainable durable peace are economic reconstruction (Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2000; Collier, 2007), institutional reform (Von Hippel, 2000), and security 
sector reform (Collier, 2007). 
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2.2. Peacekeeping Operations’ Ability to Establish Peace 
 
 
 
Just like democratization, UN peacekeeping operations‟ effect on war duration 
is contested among the scholars as well. Basically, scholars who agree that the UN 
interventions have an effect on the duration of wars are divided into two as having an 
effect of shortening or prolonging the conflict. However, there is a lack of research on 
UN peacekeeping operations‟ effects on war duration and this may be due to the fact 
that peacekeeping operations are generally assumed to be implemented after an 
agreement is signed. 
Focusing solely on the UN interventions, Gilligan and Sergenti (2007) could 
find no causal effect of interventions in shortening the war. Betts (1994) focuses only 
on the UN peacekeeping operations as well, and he suggests that if the UN undertakes 
the role of an imperial impartial, which is actively overpowering both sides, then 
interventions may reduce the duration of a civil war. In addition to Betts‟ (1994) 
suggestion for the neutral role of the UN, if the UN peacekeeping operations are 
regarded as neutral interventions, Regan (2002) hypothesizes that rather than biased 
interventions where only one of the conflicting parties is supported, neutral 
interventions lead to shorter wars. This is due to the assumption that neutral 
interventions “distribute resources in a manner that increases equality” (Regan, 2002, 
p. 64). 
From the contribution perspective of UN peacekeeping operations though, 
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014) posit that when the UN peacekeeping 
operations are deployed into active conflicts with larger numbers of armed military 
troops, combat hostilities between the belligerents effectively reduce. As it is evident, 
scholars have not reached an agreement yet for the effect of UN interventions on the 
duration of conflicts, and this is partly due to the causality problems of not being 
certain that the UN intervention is the sole causer of war duration to be longer or 
shorter.  
Rationalist explanations of war can be applied to civil wars, and therefore this 
literature is highly related to the UN peacekeeping operations. As a rationalist 
explanation of war, Fearon (1995) argues that although wars are costly, wars may 
 8 
occur, endure, and recur because of information asymmetries and commitment 
problems. Conflicts are in a sense ways to learn about the other party‟s resolve, and 
combatants may easily misrepresent information in order to reach a more beneficial 
agreement (Wagner, 2000; Fearon, 1995).  
As noted by Fearon (1995), commitment problems can lead to war, but it is 
also a major issue in civil wars as well (Powell, 2002, 2006). For instance, states 
usually require insurgent groups to declare ceasefire and give up arms in order to 
reach a negotiated agreement, but since their weapons are the only power they have, 
insurgent groups prefer fighting to giving concessions in an agreement. Due to the 
commitment problems, insurgents cannot trust the government officials for reneging 
on the terms of the agreement. Therefore, an intervening third party should be able to 
share privately held information between the parties, and help combatants commit 
peaceful settlements. Thus, with the involvement of a trustable third-party, which is in 
this case the UN, combatants may indeed accept the termination of war (Walter, 1997, 
2002). 
 
 
 
2.3. Peacekeeping Operations’ Effect on Democratization 
 
 
 
Some scholars have argued that democratization is one of the crucial goals of 
peacekeeping operations. However, the viability of developing democracy through 
peacekeeping is contested among scholars. On the one hand, some scholars support 
the notion that the UN peacekeeping operations are likely to lead to democratization 
at the recipient countries. While Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) were testing the 
success rates of peacekeeping operations, they posed democratization as a measure 
for success, and Doyle and Sambanis (2006) consequently argued that the 
peacekeeping operations are not only successful in keeping peace, but they establish a 
minimal level of democracy as well. In addition, Pickering and Pecency (2006), and 
Heldt (2011) determine that the UN interventions promote transition to democracy.  
On the other hand, other scholars propose that the UN peacekeeping 
operations do not have a relation with democratization. For instance, Gurses and 
Mason (2006, 2008) did not find any effect of peacekeeping operations on 
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democratization. Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) assert that the UN 
interventions are unlikely to lead to democracy. From a different point of view 
though, Fortna (2008b) suggests that peacekeeping does not have any explicit effect 
on democratization, because the positive and negative effects, respectively promoting 
peace and blocking democratization by crowding with local processes of political 
development, cancel each other out. Results on peacekeeping operations‟ effect on 
democratization differ due to their different statistical models and measures in their 
research designs. Therefore, a consensus is not reached regarding the peacekeeping‟s 
effect on democratization among the scholars, and the literature has yet to provide a 
tenable answer. 
 
 
 
2.4. Size and Composition of Peacekeeping Operations 
 
 
 
 Research on UN peacekeeping operations from a rationalist perspective 
reveals that the size and composition of peacekeeping operations matters. According 
to Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009), the UN, as a credible intervening third-party, signals 
credible commitment through deploying a great number of peacekeeping personnel, 
and consequently, more troops increase the capacity of missions against insurgent 
groups.  
From a rationalist bargaining perspective, Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 
(2013) argue that the UN is able to mitigate information asymmetries and 
commitment problems. Hence, by examining the operations‟ compositions for their 
influence on the duration of peace from a rationalist bargaining model perspective, 
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013) indicate that “larger UN troop commitments 
reduce the risk of civil conflict recurrence. … As the amount of UN troop personnel 
increase, the duration of peace after a civil war increases” (p. 16). However, they 
could not find any support for having large numbers of UN observer personnel 
making informational assistances in order to overcome the information asymmetries. 
Thus, Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009), and Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) 
argue alike and signify the importance of size and composition of the UN 
peacekeeping operations.  
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 Peacekeeping literature can still be considered as a recent literature, but it has 
proliferated immensely in recent decades. Throughout the evolution of the 
peacekeeping literature, scholars have focused on different dimensions and concerns 
of the UN peacekeeping operations. These dimensions can be summed up in three 
main topics. First topic focuses on understanding thoroughly how the UN 
peacekeeping operations work both in theory and practice. Secondly, the UN 
peacekeeping operations‟ effectiveness is a major issue that has been overwhelmingly 
worked on. Last major focus is on how to improve the UN peacekeeping operations 
through providing various suggestions. Some of these concerns that are depicted in 
this literature review are the effectiveness of the operations, operations‟ effect on 
democratization and war duration, and operations‟ size and composition‟s importance 
on the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations.  
 The literature evolved from a pessimistic stance to an optimistic one where 
recent research has reached a consensus on the effectiveness of peacekeeping 
operations with the UN peacekeeping operations‟ ability to create durable peace. 
However, for the UN peacekeeping operations‟ effect on democratization, a 
consensus is not reached yet among the scholars. Also, for the UN peacekeeping 
operations‟ effect on war duration, most of the scholars study general third party 
interventions, not specifically the UN peacekeeping operations. However, those who 
solely focus on the UN peacekeeping could not reach a consensus on peacekeeping‟s 
effect on war duration partly due to the causality problems. Besides, the lack of 
research on this issue may be due to the assumption that peacekeeping operations are 
usually implemented after an agreement is signed. Lastly, recent studies emphasize 
that size and composition of the UN peacekeeping operations matter for reducing the 
risk of civil war recurrence and creating an environment of durable peace.  
 The next section will focus on the theoretical framework, and we will discuss 
theories on peacekeeping operations with their advantages and shortcomings. In the 
meantime, we will form our hypotheses.  
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3 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 This section provides a theoretical framework that identifies the Realist and 
Liberal accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Hypotheses that will 
both test the arguments of these theories and other relevant arguments will be formed 
and stated after a brief introduction to the theories and their arguments. 
 
 
 
3.1. Realist Accounts 
 
 
 
 Realist-inspired accounts explain states‟ contributions to peacekeeping with 
self-interest (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). There are two variants of the self-interest 
argument. First, states whose interests are in favor of preserving the status quo are 
more likely to contribute to peacekeeping operations as an exercise of foreign policy 
(Bellamy and Williams, 2013). Second, as a more recent argument, states are likely to 
participate in peacekeeping operations in order to preserve or increase their position 
and prestige in the world (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Neack, 1995).  
Self-interest arguments apply to both Western and non-Western states. For 
instance, peace operations were dominated by Western middle powers during the 
Cold War due to the states‟ interest of gaining prestige and consequently enhancing 
their position in world politics (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Bruneau, 2004). 
Bellamy and Williams (2013) argue likewise for non-Western countries, such as 
India, in the sense that their contributions to peacekeeping operations are explained 
through their enhanced international status. Lastly, Neack (1995) suggests that states 
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contribute to peacekeeping operations in order to influence UN‟s decisions in their 
interests.  
Realist accounts of peace operations have been overwhelmingly studied in the 
literature. However, previous research has not established a common finding for 
Realist-inspired self-interest arguments, and most of them studied the likelihood of 
establishing a peace operation. On the one hand, Fortna (2008) claims that 
peacekeeping is less likely in former colonies of Permanent-5 members, and strategic 
resources, such as oil, has no significant relationship with peacekeeping operations. 
On the other hand, de Jonge Oudraat (1996) argues otherwise and states that an 
intervention is likely if it engages Permanent-5 member states‟ interests. De Jonge 
Oudraat (1996) defines interests of Permanent-5 members as target countries having a 
strategic or economic importance for a Permanent-5 member, former ally of a 
Permanent-5 member, or involving a party that a Permanent-5 member has close ties 
with (p. 517).  
We will test the self-interest argument by using the same measures of 
contributor interest through recipient countries being former colonies or having 
strategic resources, such as oil. Thereby, we will be testing self-interest argument for 
the initial contribution rates by taking into account countries‟ colonial and trade-based 
relationships.  
Instead of analyzing the likelihood of establishing a peace operation though, 
we elaborate the self-interest argument with a focus on the Permanent-5 member 
states‟ likelihood of participating in the initial deployment. Permanent-5 members are 
significant to the UN peacekeeping operations both for their ability to establish a 
peacekeeping operation and for their contributions to the operations. Since the major 
powers try to preserve the status quo (e.g. USA), and since the growing major powers 
try to enhance their position (e.g. China), we believe that the Permanent-5 members 
are more sensitive to self-interest than non-Permanent-5 members. Therefore, we 
reach our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Permanent-5 countries are more likely to participate in UN 
peacekeeping operations that are of interest to them compared to non-Permanent-5 
countries. 
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Unlike previous research, in addition to Permanent-5 countries‟ contributions, 
we will also examine democracies‟ participation incentives by testing self-interest 
argument for democracies separately. We believe democratic countries may act 
accordingly with their interests in fuel exports and colonial ties in order to enhance 
their position in the world. Although self-interest may not be the sole factor in 
participation to peacekeeping operations, it may still be a significant factor in 
participation rates. Therefore, we expect to find support for both hypotheses of 
Permanent-5 and democracy. In order to see if democratic countries contribute more 
to the peacekeeping operations where there is a self-interest situation for them, we 
formed a hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Democracies are more likely to participate in UN peacekeeping 
operations that are of interest to them compared to non-democracies. 
International security threat‟s impact on the likelihood of a peacekeeping 
operation is another major issue of contention in the Realist accounts. Previous 
research has not reached an agreement on this issue either. Fortna (2008) proposes 
this factor by examining the threat of a civil war through spilling across borders. She 
then finds that a civil war‟s threat to international peace does not lead to a 
peacekeeping operation. Unlike Fortna (2008), de Jonge Oudraat (1996) looks into 
other factors as well and reaches a different conclusion. He considers a conflict as a 
threat to international peace and security if the internal conflict “is not contained 
within the territory of the state from whence it sprang … [and] if it engages the 
interests of more distant powers” (p. 518). So, de Jonge Oudraat (1996) asserts that if 
an internal conflict involves neighboring states by sending large numbers of refugees, 
and if it threatens to lead to violence elsewhere in the region, peacekeeping operations 
are more likely (p. 518). From another perspective, Bove and Elia (2011) argue that 
threat to global and regional stability, and the number of displaced people are some of 
the robust explanations of when states choose to intervene.  
Rather than analyzing the international security threat‟s impact on the 
likelihood of a peacekeeping operation as Fortna (2008) and de Jonge Oudraat (1996) 
did, we examine international security threat‟s impact on the duration of forming of a 
UN Security Council resolution, duration of deployment of the initial forces, and 
initial participation rates. We measure international security threat by the refugee 
population of the recipient country. Since international security threat is a significant 
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issue both for the UN and the participating countries, we expect to find support for the 
following hypotheses. These hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: If a conflict poses an international security threat with large 
numbers of refugees, then the resolution will form faster.  
Hypothesis 4: If a conflict poses an international security threat with large 
numbers of refugees, then that UN peacekeeping operation will deploy faster.  
Hypothesis 5: If a conflict poses an international security threat with large 
numbers of refugees, then the contribution to that UN peacekeeping operation will be 
higher. 
 
 
 
3.2. Liberal Accounts 
 
 
 
 Liberal peace theory is the most influential theory in peacekeeping operations 
(Bellamy et al., 2010). At the interstate level, liberal peace theory, or democratic 
peace theory, is based on the observation that democracies tend not to fight with each 
other (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Bellamy et al., 2010). Advocates of this theory 
propose several reasons to explain this observation. First, normative theory of the 
democratic peace argues that the reason for the democratic peace is the shared norms 
of negotiation, compromise and cooperation held by democracies (Dixon, 1994; Maoz 
and Russett, 1993, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Owen, 1994). This account is also 
supported by democracies‟ joint membership in the international organizations and 
democracies‟ shared economical interests in trade (Oneal and Russett, 1999; Hegre, 
2000). 
Secondly, structural account locates democratic peace‟s reason in the 
democracies‟ institutional constraints imposed through their judiciaries, legislatures, 
and electorates (Owen, 1994; Bellamy et al., 2010; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004). 
As an underlying assumption of the structural account, inevitably, executives of 
democracies must gain approval from their legislatures and electorates. So, as Bueno 
de Mesquita, Koch, and Siverson  (2004) argue, in order not to risk losing the support 
of the electorate and the winning coalition, democracies engage in wars when the 
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wars are cheap and short, and since democracies‟ fight with each other would neither 
be cheap nor short, democracies tend not to fight with each other.  
 Contemporary peacekeeping operations are mostly informed by liberal peace 
theory, in the sense that peace operations try to create stable peace through creating 
democratic societies and enabling liberal free market economies (Bellamy et al., 
2010). As former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) indicates, 
“there is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of 
law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and 
security in any new and stable political order” (para. 59). In addition, former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2005) also states that “the United Nations does more 
than any other single organization to promote and strengthen democratic institutions 
and practices around the world” (para. 151).  
 The Liberal account of peacekeeping operations argues that democratic states 
are more likely to participate in peace operations than non-democratic states (Bellamy 
and Williams, 2013). Democratic peace theory emphasizes three reasons for 
democracies‟ incentives for providing peacekeepers. First, democracies derive their 
legitimacy from liberal principles, and therefore they readily accept the position that 
inalienable rights of individuals must be protected and promoted (Doyle, 1996; 
Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Lebovic, 2004). Secondly, democratic leaders believe 
that democratic practices can be exported and humanitarian objectives can be pursued 
because these principles are inalienable from self-interest (Bellamy and Williams, 
2013; Lebovic, 2004). This is due to the democratic governments‟ shared interest in 
creating “economic, political, and security conditions in which peace, prosperity, and 
democracy can thrive” (Lebovic, 2004, p. 912). Third, democracies are more likely to 
join international organizations and cooperate with each other to achieve their shared 
goals like peace and security (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Pevehouse, 2002; 
Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006).  
The Liberal account of peacekeeping operations argues that democracies tend 
to participate in peacekeeping because they believe it fosters peace and spreads 
democracy and human rights (Bellamy and Williams, 2013; Owen, 1994). However, 
as Bellamy and Williams (2013) state, although it seems as if there is a link between 
democracy and contribution to peacekeeping operations, it is a probabilistic one, 
because these dispositions do not always translate into contributions. We will test this 
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argument for initial deployments, and we expect that the result will support the 
Liberal account of UN peacekeeping operations. In order to answer this question, we 
reach our hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Democracies contribute more personnel than non-democracies. 
Previous literature has tested the effect of liberal factors on the likelihood of 
establishing a peacekeeping operation. Humanitarian impulse argument supports the 
fact that longer and more deadly conflicts are more likely to receive intervention 
(Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Regan, 2000; Beardsley, 2004; Jakobsen, 1996; Bove 
and Elia, 2011). However, Fortna (2008) specifically tests this argument for 
peacekeeping operations and she comes to the opposite conclusion that a more deadly 
war does not increase the likelihood of establishing a peacekeeping operation.  
In line with previous research, we test the humanitarian impulse argument by 
looking at the effect of battle-related deaths on the duration of forming resolutions 
and of deployment, and participation rates. These hypotheses will test the UN and the 
participating countries‟ willingness to deliver their commitment to the humanitarian 
principles. In the case of high battle-related deaths, we hope to find promptly formed 
resolutions and deployments, and higher participation rates, especially from 
democracies. However, as a counter argument, costs of sending troops to the UN 
peacekeeping operations may be more than the gains, in the sense that recipient 
countries with high battle-related deaths may mean a more dangerous mission, and 
may lead contributing countries to lose their citizens. Therefore, we expect to find that 
the UN peacekeeping operations that are established at recipient countries with high 
battle-related deaths may suffer from longer deployment durations and insufficient 
participation rates. Therefore, we reach our hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7: The higher the battle-related deaths, the quicker a resolution 
will form. 
Hypothesis 8a: The higher the battle-related deaths, the quicker the 
deployment. 
Hypothesis 8b: The higher the battle-related deaths, the slower the 
deployment. 
Hypothesis 9a: The higher the battle-related deaths, the higher the 
participation.  
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Hypothesis 9b: The higher the battle-related deaths, the lower the 
participation.  
In addition, we will test the humanitarian argument with the duration of 
conflict. We want to test the conflict duration‟s relation to the duration of forming 
resolutions and deploying forces, and participation rates of all countries and 
democracies specifically. We expect to find positive correlations between our 
variables. Accordingly, we present our three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 10: If the conflict has lasted a long time, then a resolution forms 
faster.  
Hypothesis 11: If the conflict has lasted a long time, then the deployment is 
faster. 
Hypothesis 12: If the conflict has lasted a long time, then the participation rate 
is higher. 
We wanted to test the humanitarian argument of the Liberal account with a 
new measure to the peacekeeping literature as well. Although battle-related deaths 
spread over the years may be significant for the UN peacekeeping operations, we 
believe that a steep rise in battle-related deaths in a short period of time may alert 
both the UN and the participating countries, and may eventually impel the quick 
formation and deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. Spike in battle-related 
deaths is measured through taking the average of battle-related deaths prior to the 
peacekeeping operation‟s establishment, and if the year before the peacekeeping 
operation has more deaths than average, then we say that there is a spike. By testing 
battle-related deaths, conflict duration, and spike in battle-related deaths, we will also 
be testing the conflict intensity‟s effect on delays in resolution and deployment, and 
participation rates. In case of a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country, 
although we hope for prompt formation of resolutions and deployment of initial 
forces, and high participation rates, since costs of sending troops may be higher than 
the gains, we expect low participation rates. We present four other hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 13: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then the resolution is 
formed faster.  
Hypothesis 14: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then deployment is 
faster. 
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Hypothesis 15a: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then participation is 
higher. 
Hypothesis 15b: If there is a spike in battle-related deaths, then participation is 
lower.  
According to the Liberal account of the UN peacekeeping operations, 
democracies are more likely to participate in peacekeeping operations. However, 
since the first deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation is of vital importance, the 
difference between democracies‟ and non-democracies‟ deployment rates has to be 
taken into consideration as well. We believe that democracies may protract the 
process and spend more time in deploying personnel to the UN peacekeeping 
operations, and non-democracies may act quicker, because advanced democracies 
have more complex decision-making processes than autocracies or developing 
democracies. Therefore, we reach our last hypothesis on the Liberal account: 
Hypothesis 16: Non-democracies deploy faster than democracies.  
 
 
 
3.3. Geography 
 
 
  
Previous literature finds that states choose to intervene when the conflict area 
is proximate to their territories (Bove and Elia, 2011). In line with this robust finding, 
we believe that one of the other important factors that determine the contributing 
countries‟ contribution rates to the UN peacekeeping operations is the geographical 
proximity of the conflict area. We argue that countries are more likely to participate in 
UN peacekeeping operations in countries that are geographically closer to them. This 
is partially due to cheaper and easier transportation, and especially due to the fear of 
spillover. As Bove and Elia (2011) state, “geographic proximity to the country in 
conflict increases the utility a neighboring country expects to get from the cessation of 
the hostilities. Sharing a border with a country at war means an increase in the 
probability of instability in the surrounding area (spillover effects)” (p. 703). For this 
reason, our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 17: Geographically proximal countries are more likely to 
participate in the initial deployment.   
 19 
Since we believe that geographically proximal countries are more likely to 
contribute to the UN peacekeeping operations, we argue that regions‟ democratic 
compositions may reflect the UN peacekeeping operations‟ contributions. In order to 
see the relationship between democratic compositions of regions and operations, we 
compare the averages of Polity 2 scores of the countries at the region and the initial 
contributing countries at the operations. We expect to find a positive correlation 
between regions‟ and operations‟ democratic compositions. Previous research has 
lacked this notion of regions‟ democratic compositions being related to the UN 
peacekeeping operations‟ democratic compositions. Jonah Victor (2011) indirectly 
supports our hypothesis at hand only for Africa by stating that both UN and non-UN 
peace operations‟ contributions in Africa are composed mainly of non-democracies. 
However, our finding will encompass all the regions, and thus it will be novel to the 
literature. Our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 18: The more democratic the region, the more participation by the 
democratic countries.  
 
 
 
3.4. Population 
 
 
 
We believe that the recipient countries‟ population and area may affect both 
the mandate sizes and consequently the initial participation rates of UN peacekeeping 
operations. We expect to find a positive correlation between these variables. So, we 
propose two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 19: The greater the recipient country‟s population and area, the 
higher the mandate requirements. 
Hypothesis 20: The greater the recipient country‟s population and area, the 
higher the participation.  
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3.5. Follow-up Peacekeeping Operations 
 
 
 
The UN peacekeeping operations can be distinguished by the nature of their 
formation. The operation can either be formed for the first time for a conflict or it can 
be a follow-up operation established after an operation that was also established for 
the same conflict at the same recipient country. For example, United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) is a follow-up operation of UN Angola 
Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), and likewise, UN Angola Verification Mission 
III (UNAVEM III) is a follow-up mission of UNAVEM II. Follow-up missions may 
have different issues and goals at focus, but the key point is that they are established 
for the same conflict at the same recipient country. 
We argue that there is a gradual decrease in contribution rates for follow-up 
peacekeeping operations. Participant countries‟ hope for follow-up operations to be 
successful may have decreased with the establishment of another peacekeeping 
operation at the same target country, or another operation may have been established 
because of more intense recurring conflicts at the same target country and the 
contributing countries may be reluctant to send their citizens to an intense conflict. 
For follow-up peacekeeping operations‟ contribution rates, we do not take into 
account the takeovers from previous operations, and only measure the initial 
deployment for the newly established peacekeeping operation. Our hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 21: First UN peacekeeping operations receive more contribution 
than follow-up ones.  
 
 
 
3.6. The Effect of the Brahimi Report 
 
 
 
In 2000, the “Brahimi Report,” which is the common name for the Report of 
the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, was a response to a combination of 
factors, including the institutional failings and demand for new peacekeeping 
operations (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 129). The Brahimi Report (2000) made robust 
recommendations to improve the UN peace operations. First, the report calls for 
 21 
improved decision-making at UN headquarters with a better flow of information (p. 
12). Secondly, it suggests clear mandates with realistic advices from the Secretariat, 
and clear wording of the requirements (p. 10-11). Besides, the Panel recommends the 
mandates to be authorized only if it is applicable, and the forces to be financed before 
it is deployed in order to have the contributing countries‟ commitment beforehand (p. 
10-11).  
Third, rapid and effective deployment during the critical period of the first 
several weeks following a ceasefire is the key to “establishing both a stable peace and 
the credibility of the peacekeepers” (p. 15, para. 87). In accordance, “the Panel thus 
proposes that the United Nations develop the operational capabilities to fully deploy 
„traditional‟ peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security 
Council resolution, and complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days” (p. 15, 
para. 88). So, the UN should be able to use forces at the Standby Arrangements 
System (UNSAS), where required personnel are available in short notice (p. 17). In 
addition, the UN should have its own logistics in order to send the forward elements 
of a peace operation (p. 28). As the last suggestion of the Brahimi Report, the 
deployed forces should be effective with peacekeepers having basic training and 
equipment (p. 19).    
The Brahimi Report converted the UN strategy from traditional peacekeeping 
to complex multidimensional peacekeeping, and it was also a turning point for the 
literature (Fortna and Howard, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Bellamy, 
Williams, and Griffin, 2010). As a consequence of more precise methodologies and 
theoretical works in mid-2000s‟ peacekeeping literature, recent studies embraced an 
optimistic stance and revealed that the peacekeeping operations are effective policy 
tools despite their limitations (Fortna and Howard, 2008). 
According to Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010, p. 143-6), certain things 
have changed after the release of the Brahimi Report. First, post-Brahimi operations 
encompass many types of peace operations, with a broad spectrum of traditional 
monitoring to more complex operations. Second, both UN and non-UN peace 
operations grew in number and size. Third, post-2000 missions are willing to fulfill all 
embracing mandate requirements that range from monitoring to establishing rule of 
law with the help of multiple personnel types of troops, military observers, police 
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forces, and experts on conflicts. Lastly, the UN‟s ongoing operations are relatively 
strong compared to the previous ones. 
With the Brahimi Report‟s suggestions and following changes in the UN 
peacekeeping operations, we believe that there will be differences between periods of 
1990-2000 and post-2000 operations. First, with the Brahimi Report‟s suggestion of 
rapid deployment, we believe that the deployments will be faster in the post-2000 
peacekeeping operations. Therefore, our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 22: UN peacekeeping operations are deployed more rapidly after 
the Brahimi Report. 
Second, as it is noted earlier, there is a strong willingness among the 
contributing countries to fulfill the mandate requirements and deploy various types of 
personnel in order to cover the broad range of tasks. Therefore, we argue that initial 
deployments will fulfill mandates‟ requirements in the post-2000 period better than 
the 1990-2000 period. Our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 23: UN peacekeeping operations are better at reaching initial 
mandates‟ requirements with first deployments after the Brahimi Report.  
Contributing countries in the 1990s are mostly democracies and middle 
powers, and non-democracies started to contribute more in the post-2000 
peacekeeping operations (Andersson, 2000; Bellamy et al., 2010; Luck, 2006). In 
addition, as the Brahimi Report (2000) states, “in contrast to the long tradition of 
developed countries providing the bulk of the troops for United Nations peacekeeping 
operations during the Organization‟s first 50 years, in the last few years 77 per cent of 
the troops in formed military units deployed in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, as of end-June 2000, were contributed by developing countries” (p. 17). In 
accordance, we will test this shift in the nature of UN troop contributing countries 
with only focusing on initial deployments, and we expect to find support for these 
arguments. Hence forth, we present our last hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 24: The nature of UN troop contributing countries shifted in the 
21
st
 century with respect to receiving initial deployments more from democratic to 
non-democratic countries.  
Next section will explain the data and methodology that we used in this thesis.  
 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Methodology 
 
 
 
As our research method, we used ordinary least squares regression analysis in 
order to estimate the relationship between our dependent and independent variables, 
and predict future UN and contributing countries‟ actions. Regression analysis is very 
important for our research because its results indicate the effect of independent 
variables with their directions and sizes on the dependent variable.  
 We use different units of analysis for our varying questions at hand. When we 
measure our variables‟ effect on the speed of forming resolutions and deployments, 
we analyze the data at the mission level. However, when we test the hypotheses on 
contributors, we study our variables at the contributor level. The research design is 
based on descriptive statistics and cross-sectional analysis of the dependent and 
independent variables that will be mentioned below. However, we only have fifty 
cases, and we realize the limitations of a small sample size.   
 
 
 
4.2. Data 
 
 
 
 Post-1990 period has witnessed more than fifty UN peacekeeping operations, 
and our dataset contains most of them.
1
 We only cover the post-1990 period because 
                                                        
1
 We could not find any contribution data on three UN peacekeeping operations, and therefore we did not include 
them in our dataset. These operations are UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), UN Aouzou Strip Observer 
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the number of UN peacekeeping operations has increased immensely in the post-Cold 
War period, and with the ending of the bipolar Cold War, states were fully free to 
participate in peacekeeping operations without any political obstacles. In addition, 
post-1990 data is publicly accessible, and this fact eases the accuracy of the analysis 
and paves the way for a replicable research. The first peacekeeping operation that we 
included in our data is established in 1991, and the last one is formed in 2013. 
Therefore, our research covers the recent trends in the UN peacekeeping operations 
and provides new insights to the peacekeeping literature.  
 We collected data on UN peacekeeping operations‟ deployment numbers and 
dates through UN‟s monthly released factsheets. Unlike previous research that 
examine all the troop contributions, this study only takes initial deployment facts in 
consideration due to our research question. Also, unlike most of the previous research 
that focuses solely on troop contributions, this study examines all contribution types, 
which are troop, police, military observer, and expert.  
This research is the first systematic analysis to study the promptness of 
forming UN Security Council resolutions and deployments of UN peacekeeping 
operations. Except for the deployment dates, all other information on UN 
peacekeeping operations are retrieved from the UN peacekeeping operations‟ official 
website for every mission. In addition, we checked all the resolutions that established 
the UN peacekeeping operations at hand, and it is seen that except some cases, the 
UN usually requests support from all member states and international organizations. 
Therefore, as another novelty to the literature, our main dataset not only includes the 
countries that participated in the UN peacekeeping operations, but also incorporates 
the countries that could participate but chose not to. By including 195 such states in 
the sample, we will be able to clearly estimate the differences between contributing 
state characters for the UN peacekeeping operations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Group (UNASOG), and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) that are established accordingly in 1992, 1994, and 2014.  
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4.2.1. Dependent Variables 
 
 
When we analyze the speed of the UN peacekeeping operations, we have two 
dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the duration between suggestion 
and resolution, which shows the delay of forming of a resolution, and secondly, the 
duration between resolution and deployment, which indicates the delay of 
deployment. We also test the duration between suggestion and deployment in order to 
indicate the total amount of time passed for an operation to be formed and deployed. 
We measure the duration between these variables by coding the number of months 
passed between the two events for every mission. For example, in 1998, United 
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was suggested in 
February, its resolution (S/RES/1159) was formed in March, and it was deployed in 
April. So, we code the months‟ numbers as “2, 3, 4” accordingly to suggestion, 
resolution, and deployment. We measure the time passed to form a resolution by 
subtracting 2 from 3, which is equal to the duration between suggestion and 
resolution. Likewise, we measure the delay of deployment by subtracting 3 from 4, 
which equals to the amount of time in between resolution and deployment. Lastly, we 
measure the time passed for MINURCA to be formed and deployed by subtracting 2 
from 4. Since the data on delays are coded for every mission, we test these dependent 
variables in our mission level dataset. 
Our second set of dependent variables contains the size of the peacekeeping 
operations. These include fulfilled mandate percentages, and troop and total personnel 
contributions. Fulfilled mandate percentages are equal to the proportion of deployed 
personnel in relation to the authorized personnel by the UN. For example, United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO) is established with UN Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010). The 
Security Council “authorizes that MONUSCO shall comprise, (…), a maximum of 
19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 
personnel of formed police units” (S/RES/1925, 2010, p. 3, italics in original). The 
authorized personnel for MONUSCO is 22,016, and 19,685 personnel is initially 
deployed. So, when we take the ratio of the deployed to authorized personnel number, 
we find that 89% of the mandate requirements are fulfilled. Since this information is 
for missions, this dependent variable is at the mission level.  
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For troop and other personnel contribution types though, since these data 
correspond to a country, the main dataset that encompasses all contributing and non-
contributing countries are used. For example, for United Nations Observer Mission in 
Angola (MONUA), France sent ten troop and seven military observers, and Egypt 
sent one troop, nineteen police, and ten military observers. In addition to these two 
countries, fifteen countries contributed personnel to MONUA, and their contributions 
are coded likewise. When we are analyzing troop contributions, we only take troop 
contributions into account; however, when we are analyzing total personnel 
contribution, we take all the personnel contributions into account. In addition, when 
we are testing the mission level related independent variables for contributors, rather 
than using troop and other personnel contribution coded for every country, we use 
total troop and personnel contribution coded for every mission. Also, troop and other 
personnel contributions are logged because logging reduces the effect of outliers. 
 
 
Summary Table: 
 
Dependent Variable Data Source Operationalization 
Duration between 
Suggestion and Resolution 
UN‟s monthly factsheets Number of months 
between suggestion and 
resolution 
Duration between 
Resolution and 
Deployment 
UN‟s monthly factsheets Number of months 
between resolution and 
deployment 
Duration between 
Suggestion and 
Deployment 
UN‟s monthly factsheets Number of months 
between suggestion and 
deployment 
Fulfilled Mandate 
Percentages 
UN‟s monthly factsheets Deployed 
Personnel/Authorized 
Personnel 
Troop Contribution UN‟s monthly factsheets Number of troops at the 
first deployment 
Total Personnel 
Contribution 
UN‟s monthly factsheets Total number of personnel 
at the first deployment 
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4.2.2. Independent Variables 
 
 
We proposed several independent variables that might have an effect on our 
dependent variables of delay and contribution rates. First, we created a dichotomous 
variable P-5 to determine the Permanent-5 countries. As the Permanent-5 members, 
only Russia, United Kingdom, United States of America, France, and China take the 
value of 1 and the other countries are coded 0.  
We created another dichotomous variable Democracy to indicate which 
contributing and non-contributing countries are categorized as democracies or non-
democracies. We used Polity IV dataset to measure member states‟ democracy levels 
during their participation in the peacekeeping operations. Polity IV dataset attributes 
weighted scores to countries from 1800 onwards that enables researchers to analyze 
the selected countries‟ status in each year. As Munck and Verkuilen (2002) state, 
although Polity IV dataset has weaknesses as all of the existing datasets on democracy 
have, it is for now one of the best ones. According to the Polity IV dataset, regime 
types are full democracy (10), democracy (6 to 9), open anocracy (1 to 5), closed 
anocracy (-5 to 0), and autocracy (-10 to -6). The participant countries are categorized 
according to the Polity IV dataset‟s regime types with a little twist. We categorized 
democracies from 6 to 10, mixed regimes from -5 to 5, and autocracies from -10 to -6. 
For our dichotomous variable Democracy, while democratic countries take the value 
of 1, non-democracies take 0.  
We measure self-interest with the recipient country being a former colony or 
having fuel exports. Therefore, the dichotomous variable Colony is coded 1 if the 
recipient country is a former colony, and if not, it is coded as 0. We used CEPII‟s 
dyadic GeoDist database (2011) to determine the colonial links. Data on the recipient 
country‟s fuel exports come from the World Bank‟s data of fuel exports as 
percentages of merchandise exports, and we code the data of the year before the UN 
peacekeeping operation is established to account for possible endogeneity. For 
example, UNAVEM II is established in 1991 and the recipient country is Angola. We 
thereby code Angola‟s fuel exports data for 1990. 
We measure international security threat by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees‟ (UNHCR) data on total refugee population by origin 
because, as Bove and Elia (2011) and de Jonge Oudraat (1996) state, large numbers of 
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refugees put a financial and social burden on neighboring states and become a threat 
to international peace and security. As in the fuel exports data, refugee data is coded 
for the year before the UN mission was established. In order to overcome the effect of 
outliers, refugee data is logged. 
We measure a conflict‟s intensity by its duration, battle-related deaths, and the 
presence of a spike in battle-related deaths. We used UCDP Battle-Related Deaths 
dataset (version 5.0, 2014) for these variables. For conflict duration variable, we 
measure the relevant conflict‟s duration that the UN peacekeeping operation is 
established for. For battle-related deaths variable, we sum up the number of deaths for 
the years before the peacekeeping operation was established. In the meantime, we 
check the battle-related deaths dataset for every mission so that we only take into 
account the relevant data for our cases at hand. The battle-related deaths data is 
logged. Lastly, we code spikes in battle-related deaths in three steps. We start by 
calculating the total relevant battle-related deaths prior to the UN peacekeeping 
operation and then we take the average of it. If the battle-related deaths of the 
established UN peacekeeping operation‟s previous year‟s data is above the average, 
then we denote that UN peacekeeping operation to be established after a spike in 
battle-related deaths. For instance, two of the UN peacekeeping operation cases in the 
Middle East, which are UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and UN 
Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), have been established after a spike in battle-
related deaths. The dichotomous variable Spike takes take value of 1 for both of these 
Middle East cases.  
Another independent variable is the geographical proximity between the 
recipient and contributing countries. We used CEPII‟s dyadic GeoDist database 
(2011) to determine the distance between the capital cities of the recipient and 
participating countries, and we logged the distance data to reduce the effect of 
outliers. Population and area of the recipient country is also another independent 
variable, and these variables are logged as well. We used Gleditsch‟s expanded trade 
and GDP dataset (2002) for population and area data. We check every peacekeeping 
operation cases that we have for the peacekeeping operation being a follow-up one or 
not. We find this information from the UN‟s official websites for every operation, and 
code the first peacekeeping operations as 1 in our dichotomous variable First PKO.  
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 Lastly, we created a dichotomous variable Year 2000 in order to test what has 
changed in the peacekeeping operations after the Brahimi Report. Peacekeeping 
operations that are established after 2000 take the value of 1, and the other operations 
that are established in between 1990-2000 take the value of 0. The only mission that 
is established in 2000 is UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). However, 
UNMEE is established in June, which is before the Brahimi Report‟s adoption on 
November. Therefore, we include UNMEE in the period between 1990-2000, and it 
takes the value of 0.  
 
Summary Table: 
 
Independent Variable Data Source Operationalization 
Permanent-5* UN Permanent-5 countries 
(UK, USA, China, Russia, 
France) 
Democracy Polity IV dataset Democracies: 6 - 10 
Mixed regimes: 5 - (-5) 
Autocracies: (-10) – (-6) 
Colony CEPII‟s dyadic GeoDist 
database 
Former colonies 
Fuel World Bank Fuel exports as 
percentages of 
merchandise exports 
Refugee UNHCR‟s Total Refugee 
Population by Origin 
dataset 
Refugee population by 
origin (logged) 
Conflict Duration UCDP Battle-Related 
Deaths dataset 
Sum the number of years 
with deaths before the 
operation 
Battle-Related Deaths UCDP Battle-Related 
Deaths dataset 
Sum the number of deaths 
before the operation 
(logged) 
Spike UCDP Battle-Related 
Deaths dataset 
The battle-related deaths 
of the year before the 
operation is above the 
average number of deaths 
Distance CEPII‟s dyadic GeoDist 
database 
Distance between capital 
cities of recipient and 
contributor countries in 
kilometers (logged) 
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Population Gleditsch‟s expanded trade 
and GDP dataset 
Population of the recipient 
country (logged) 
Area Gleditsch‟s expanded trade 
and GDP dataset 
Area of the recipient 
country in square 
kilometers (logged) 
First PKO UN (hand-coded) First peacekeeping 
operations are established 
for the first time for a 
conflict 
Year 2000  Operations established 
after 2000 are coded as 1 
* Variables in italics are dichotomous variables.  
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5 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Speed of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
 
 
 
5.1.1. Duration of Forming Resolutions 
 
 
 Table 1 shows the regression analyses that were conducted to analyze the 
relationships between duration of forming resolutions and the factors that may have 
an effect on it. As seen in model (2), the bivariate regression analysis indicates a 
statistically significant result that forming resolutions take longer time when the 
battle-related deaths are high. If battle-related deaths increase by one percent, we 
expect delay between suggestion and resolution to increase approximately by 0.0007 
months, which is a small effect size. Therefore, hypothesis 7, which suggests that 
higher battle-related deaths are associated with quicker resolutions, is not supported. 
Refugee, conflict duration, spike in deaths, population and area, and the 
peacekeeping operation being the first do not have any statistically significant effect 
on the time takes to form a resolution. The positive, but statistically insignificant, 
estimate for conflict duration goes against hypothesis 10, which predicts that longer 
standing conflicts are associated with promptly formed resolutions. Also, for the other 
independent variables of refugee and spike, we find insignificant evidence for 
hypotheses 3 and 13, which accordingly state that resolutions are formed quicker 
when there are large numbers of refugees and a spike in battle-related deaths at the 
recipient country. As for the multiple regression analysis, none of the predictor 
variables provide significant results. One reason for the lack of statistical significance 
may be the small number of observations.  
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Table 1 
OLS Analysis of Time to Form a Resolution  
 
Dependent Variable: Delay between Suggestion and Resolution (in months) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Refugee              -0.012 
(0.05) 
     -0.082 
(0.08) 
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths  0.068** 
       (0.03) 
    0.110 
(0.07) 
Conflict Duration   0.026 
(0.03) 
   0.004 
(0.04) 
Spike (1=Spike)    -0.155 
(0.25) 
  -0.451 
(0.30) 
Logged Population     0.312 
(0.19) 
 0.117 
(0.21) 
Logged Area     -0.170 
(0.15) 
 -0.103 
(0.13) 
First PKO (1=First) 
 
     0.433 
(0.28) 
0.274 
(0.37) 
Constant 
 
0.757 
(0.57) 
0.219 
(0.14) 
     0.530*** 
         (0.15) 
      0.679*** 
(0.21) 
-0.162 
(1.52) 
0.250 
(0.24) 
1.042 
(2.15) 
R-squared 0.001 0.066 0.019 0.007 0.045 0.030 0.170 
N. of cases 47.000 49.000 49.000 49.000 45.000 49.000 44.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.  
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5.1.2. Duration of Deployment 
 
 
 Table 2 shows the regression analyses of deployment‟s delay. None of the 
variables are significant in bivariate analyses, however in model (8), the multiple 
regression analysis shows that both refugee population and battle-related deaths are 
significant at the 10% level with refugee variable being negative and battle-related 
deaths variable being positive. If numbers of refugees increase by one percent, we 
expect delay between resolution and deployment to decrease approximately by 0.004 
months, holding other variables constant. In addition, if the number of battle-related 
deaths increases by one percent, the predicted delay between resolution and 
deployment would increase by 0.003 months, holding other variables constant. 
Basically, these results tell us that while the large numbers of refugees quicken the 
deployment, higher battle-related deaths slow down the deployment. 
 We insignificantly find in models (1) and (4) that large numbers of refugees, 
and a spike in deaths at the recipient country are associated with faster deployments. 
Moreover, in model (2), the positive but statistically insignificant estimate for battle-
related deaths goes against hypothesis 8a, and supports hypothesis 8b by denoting 
longer time passed for deployments. In other words, hypotheses 4, 8b, and 14 find 
insignificant support. In model (3) though, we find insignificant evidence against 
hypothesis 11 that posits faster deployment rates if the conflict is long-standing.  
 In Table 2, we also tested hypothesis 16, which argues for non-democratic 
countries‟ ability of deploying faster than democratic ones. Since the UN‟s factsheets 
on force deployments only indicate the month the forces were deployed, we cannot 
separate which countries‟ forces were deployed at what time specifically. Hence, we 
measured democratic and non-democratic countries‟ promptness of deployment by 
taking the averages of contributing countries‟ Polity 2 scores for every mission, and 
observing Polity 2 scores‟ averages‟ relation with the duration between resolution and 
deployment. We find insignificant evidence against hypothesis 19 in model (5), where 
the higher Polity 2 score averages predict quicker deployments.  
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Table 2 
OLS Analysis of Duration of Deployment 
 
Dependent Variable: Delay between Resolution and Deployment (in months) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Logged Refugee -0.079 
(0.14) 
      -0.384* 
(0.22) 
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths  0.102 
(0.06) 
     0.276* 
(0.14) 
Conflict Duration   0.069 
(0.06) 
    0.035 
(0.07) 
Spike (1=Spike)    -0.573 
(0.57) 
   -1.001 
(0.77) 
Polity 2 Average     -0.180 
(0.13) 
  -0.266 
(0.17) 
Logged Population      0.627 
(0.44) 
 0.232 
(0.46) 
Logged Area      -0.394 
(0.32) 
 -0.354 
(0.32) 
First PKO (1=First)       0.304 
(0.50) 
-0.386 
(0.69) 
Constant 2.300 
(1.66) 
    0.803** 
(0.34) 
      1.170*** 
(0.36) 
     1.621*** 
(0.49) 
     2.406*** 
(0.88) 
0.551 
(3.26) 
      1.125*** 
(0.33) 
8.568 
(5.25) 
R-squared 0.010 0.028 0.022 0.017 0.025 0.038 0.003 0.222 
N. of cases 48.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 45.000 50.000 44.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.  
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5.1.3. Duration between Suggestion and Deployment 
 
 
Table 3 shows the regression analyses of the time passed from suggestion to 
deployment and variables that may have an effect on it. In model (2), the effect of 
battle-related deaths on the duration between suggestion and deployment is significant 
at the 5% level with a positive coefficient. If battle-related deaths increase by one 
percent, we expect the time it takes to form and deploy an operation to increase by 
0.002 months. So, as in other stages of the deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
operation, we find that high battle-related deaths delay the deployment of UN forces.  
In model (7), large numbers of refugees, battle-related deaths, and spike in 
battle-related deaths have statistically significant effects. Both large numbers of 
refugees and spike in battle-related deaths predict quicker deployment rates that are 
statistically significant accordingly at the 1% and 5% levels. In fact, for recipient 
countries with spikes in deaths, the predicted time that takes to form and deploy an 
operation would nearly be 2 months shorter than where there is no spike, holding all 
other variables constant. In addition, if refugee numbers increase by one percent, we 
expect the time it takes for the formation and deployment of an operation to be shorter 
by 0.005 month, holding other variables constant. However, just like in model (2), 
higher battle-related deaths predict longer time passed in between suggestion and 
deployment at the 5% significance level. Holding other variables constant, one 
percent increase in battle-related deaths of the recipient country would prolong the 
formation and deployment of an operation by approximately 0.004 month. So, 
although battle-related deaths and large numbers of refugee variables are statistically 
significant, their effects are too small to be practically significant. However, spike in 
deaths is both statistically and practically significant with a large estimate. Therefore, 
we find significant support for 4, 8b, and 14. 
 We did not find any significant effect of refugees, conflict duration, and spike 
in deaths in bivariate regression analyses. As in model (7), in models (1) and (4), 
negative but statistically insignificant estimates show that with large numbers of 
refugees and with a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country, deployment  
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Table 3 
OLS Analysis of Duration between Suggestion and Deployment 
 
Dependent Variable: Delay between Suggestion and Deployment (in months) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Refugee -0.172 
(0.19) 
         -0.489*** 
(0.18) 
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths      0.181**                                                                          
(0.07) 
     0.352** 
(0.15) 
Conflict Duration   0.070                                                            
(0.06) 
  0.056 
(0.08) 
Spike (1=Spike)    -1.214 
(0.74) 
    -1.965** 
(0.91) 
Logged Population        1.217** 
(0.59) 
 0.725 
(0.51) 
Logged Area     -0.756* 
(0.40) 
 -0.605* 
(0.32) 
First PKO (1=First)      0.765 
(0.79) 
-0.134 
(0.96) 
Constant 4.283* 
(2.32) 
     1.226*** 
(0.42) 
    2.047*** 
(0.50) 
      2.786*** 
(0.67) 
0.480 
(3.64) 
 1.625** 
(0.62) 
7.452 
(4.65) 
R-squared 0.019 0.049 0.014 0.045 0.085 0.010 0.294 
N. of cases 47.000 49.000 49.000 49.000 45.000 49.000 44.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.  
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tends to be faster. However, long-standing conflicts at the recipient country do not 
indicate a faster deployment rate, and instead, we find insignificant evidence that 
long-standing conflicts tend to receive slower deployments. 
 
  
Figure 1: Bar graphs of means of duration between suggestion and deployment 
divided to with and without spike. 
 
Figure 1 shows the bar graphs of means of duration between suggestion and 
deployment. Clearly, UN peacekeeping operations are formed and deployed promptly 
in the case of a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country. While it takes 
approximately one and a half months for an operation to be formed and deployed in 
the case of a spike in deaths at the recipient country, it takes nearly three months for 
an operation to be deployed when there is not any steep rise in deaths. 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 have resulted in interesting findings. These results suggest 
that higher numbers of battle-related deaths in a target country are more likely to be 
related to slower resolutions and deployments. However, recipient countries with 
large numbers of refugees and a spike in battle-related deaths are more likely to 
receive quicker deployments. So, these results demonstrate the importance of the 
international security threat‟s impact on the promptness of the UN peacekeeping 
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operations‟ behavior. Also, humanitarian impulse arguments are not supported for 
their promptness in deployments. From a novel perspective though, if a spike in 
battle-related deaths is assumed to be one of the humanitarian arguments of the UN 
peacekeeping operations, then the humanitarian arguments are provided with partial 
support from the spike in battle-related deaths perspective. 
 
  
 
5.2. Percentage of Mandate Fulfilled and Individual Contribution Levels 
 
 
 
5.2.1. Realist Accounts 
 
 
Table 4 shows the regression analyses of our hypotheses on the Realist-
inspired arguments on UN peacekeeping operations. Overall, our results do not 
support these hypotheses. Although Permanent-5 and democratic countries contribute 
highly significantly with both troop and other personnel types at the 1% level, neither 
Permanent-5 members nor democracies participate more where the recipient country 
is a former colony or has fuel exports. In fact, for Permanent-5 countries, we expect 
troop and total personnel contribution to increase accordingly by 145 percent and 258 
percent, holding other variables constant. For democracies, we accordingly expect ten 
percent and seventeen percent increase in troop and total personnel contribution.  
As robust findings, all the countries, including the Permanent-5 and 
democratic countries, contribute less troops and all personnel types where the 
recipient country has fuel exports, but the effect size is small. Although recipient 
countries being former colonies respond to an increase in contribution of all personnel 
types at the 1% significance level, as insignificant evidences, both Permanent-5 and 
democratic countries‟ contributions to the former colonies decrease. Also, we do not 
find a significant effect for refugees. However, since the coefficient is negative, we 
find insignificant evidence contrary to hypothesis 5, which argues for high 
participation rates in the case of large numbers of refugees.  
In Table 4, we cannot find support for hypotheses 1 and 2, which propose 
increased contribution rates from Permanent-5 and democratic countries in the case of 
self-interest. In addition, we find evidence against hypothesis 5, but the estimate is not  
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Table 4 
OLS Analysis of Fuel Exports and Colonial Ties 
 
 Log. Troop Cont. Log. Total Pers C. L. T. C. L. T. P. C. Mandate Log. Tot. Troop Cont. L. T. P. C. 
P-5 (1=P-5)        1.450*** 
(0.24) 
      2.582*** 
(0.23) 
     
Fuel     -0.000** 
(0.00) 
      -0.001*** 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
   
P-5 # Fuel      -0.017*** 
(0.01) 
      -0.020*** 
(0.00) 
     
Colony (1=Colony) 0.249 
(0.17) 
       0.675*** 
(0.22) 
0.629 
(0.44) 
   0.950** 
(0.48) 
   
P-5 # Colony 0.959 
(0.65) 
-0.425 
(0.61) 
     
Democracy (1=Dem.)         0.104*** 
(0.01) 
    0.170*** 
(0.02) 
   
Democracy # Fuel       -0.001*** 
(0.00) 
    -0.002*** 
(0.00) 
   
Democracy # Colony   -0.029 
(0.50) 
-0.048 
(0.54) 
   
Logged Refugee     -0.015 
(0.03) 
-0.141 
(0.17) 
-0.095 
(0.11) 
Constant       0.112*** 
(0.01) 
0.199*** 
(0.01) 
    0.095*** 
(0.01) 
    0.177*** 
(0.01) 
   0.733** 
(0.36) 
    5.278*** 
(1.94) 
     6.433*** 
(1.18) 
R-squared 0.043 0.076 0.009 0.015 0.003 0.013 0.011 
N. of cases 8505.000 8505.000 7210.000 7210.000 48.000 48.000 48.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
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statistically significant. Therefore, the Realist-inspired accounts of the UN 
peacekeeping operations that we tested only for initial deployments are not supported 
with these results. 
 
 
 
5.2.2. Liberal Accounts 
 
 
 Table 5 shows the regression analyses of fulfilled mandate percentages of the 
initial deployments. Our results in model (3) indicate that long-standing conflicts have 
less fulfilled mandate percentages at the 10% significance level, and this fact does not 
support hypothesis 12, which states that the participation rate is higher when the 
conflict is long-standing. For every unit increase in conflict duration, we expect an 
approximately 0.03 point decrease in the fulfilled mandate percentages. None of the 
other bivariate regression analyses‟ results indicate a significant relationship. 
 We do not find a statistically significant effect for battle-related deaths, and 
spike in deaths at the recipient country. The coefficient variable is negative for battle-
related deaths. Therefore, while we cannot find support for hypothesis 9a, hypothesis 
9b is insignificantly supported with its argument of lower participation rates in the 
case of high battle-related deaths. In addition, we find insignificant support for 
hypothesis 15b, which proposes lower contribution rates in the case of a spike in 
battle-related deaths, and insignificant evidence against hypothesis 15a, which argues 
to the contrary.  
We also tested the follow-up UN peacekeeping operations‟ effect on the 
fulfilled mandate percentages with the dichotomous variable First PKO as an 
indicator of peacekeeping operation being the first to be established for a conflict at a 
recipient country, or the operation being a follow-up one with several peacekeeping 
operations established for the same conflict at the same recipient country. In model 
(5), the negative but statistically insignificant observation goes against hypothesis 21, 
which states that first peacekeeping operations will fulfill mandate percentages more 
than the follow-up ones. In model (7) though, we find the same result at the 10% 
significance level. We can simply interpret model (7)‟s results as first peacekeeping 
operations fulfilled mandate percentages being approximately 0.7 points lower than 
the follow-up operations.  
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Table 5 
OLS Analysis of Fulfilled Mandate Percentages 
 
Dependent Variable: Fulfilled Mandate Percentages 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Refugee -0.015 
(0.03) 
     0.016 
(0.04) 
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths  -0.059 
(0.04) 
    -0.083 
(0.09) 
Conflict Duration   -0.032* 
(0.02) 
   0.015 
(0.03) 
Spike (1=Spike)    -0.304 
(0.21) 
  -0.005 
(0.23) 
First PKO (1=First)     -0.563 
(0.36) 
 -0.736* 
(0.42) 
Logged Population      -0.057 
(0.19) 
0.162 
(0.21) 
Logged Area      -0.088 
(0.16) 
-0.192 
(0.15) 
Constant   0.733** 
(0.36) 
     0.894*** 
(0.31) 
     0.658*** 
(0.15) 
     0.687*** 
(0.18) 
     1.032*** 
(0.34) 
   2.173** 
(0.87) 
2.330* 
(1.27) 
R-squared 0.003 0.066 0.035 0.034 0.064 0.044 0.189 
N. of cases 48.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 45.000 44.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
OLS Analysis of Total Troop Contribution 
 
Dependent Variables: Log of Total Troop Contribution 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Logged Refugee -0.141 
(0.17) 
     -0.260 
(0.24) 
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths  -0.128 
(0.14) 
    -0.124 
(0.19) 
Conflict Duration   -0.012 
(0.10) 
   0.164 
(0.14) 
Spike (1=Spike)    -0.281 
(1.00) 
  0.964 
(1.04) 
First PKO (1=First)          -3.182*** 
(1.07) 
     -4.303*** 
(1.53) 
Logged Population      -0.927 
(0.87) 
-0.326 
(0.95) 
Logged Area      0.375 
(0.43) 
-0.178 
(0.50) 
Constant       5.278*** 
(1.94) 
      4.455*** 
(0.93) 
      3.772*** 
(0.59) 
      3.854*** 
(0.64) 
     6.409*** 
(0.94) 
7.642 
(6.05) 
    15.220** 
(7.43) 
R-squared 0.013 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.117 0.028 0.185 
N. of cases 48.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 45.000 44.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
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As part of our participation hypotheses, in addition to the fulfilled mandate 
percentages, we also test for troop and total personnel contributions. In Table 6‟s 
bivariate and multiple regression analyses, we find that first peacekeeping operations 
receive fewer troops and this effect is practically and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. For first peacekeeping operations, we expect troop contribution to decrease by 
430 percent, holding other variables constant. This result once more does not support 
hypothesis 21. We also find some evidence that total troop contribution decreases 
where there is a spike in battle-related deaths, and when refugee population, battle-
related deaths, and conflict duration increases, but these estimates are not statistically 
significant.  
In Table 7, in addition to the total personnel contributions, we also test for the 
authorized personnel number and predictor variables that are what we thought to be 
effective in the UN‟s decision-making for the peacekeeping operations‟ personnel 
requirements. By having two dependent variables of authorized and total deployed 
personnel number in Table 7, we can clearly see which aspects are more important for 
the UN Security Council while establishing peacekeeping operations and how the 
contributor countries react to these aspects. Note that we refer the UN as a single, 
unified decision-making organism, and therefore we do not differentiate between the 
various decision-making processes and structures within the UN.  
Table 7‟s total personnel contribution results are similar to the troop 
contribution results in Table 6. In Table 7, battle-related deaths at the recipient 
country correspond to a more significant result, in which it indicates that higher 
battle-related deaths lower the total personnel contribution at the 10% significance 
level. If battle-related deaths increase by one percent, we expect total personnel 
contribution to decrease by 0.1 percent. In other words, while we find significant 
support for hypothesis 9b, we do not find support for 9a. In addition, both in bivariate 
and multiple regression analyses, Table 7 indicates that first UN peacekeeping 
operations receive less total personnel contribution at the 5% significance level. For 
first peacekeeping operations, we expect total personnel contribution to decrease by 
289 percent, holding all other variables constant. Therefore, we once more do not find 
support for hypothesis 21.  
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Table 7 
OLS Analysis of Authorized Personnel and Total Personnel Contribution 
 
 Authorized Log. T. P. C. Aut. L.T.P.C. Aut. L.T.P.C. Aut. L.T.P.C. Aut. L.T.P.C. Aut. L.T.P.C. Aut. L.T.P.C. 
Logged 
Refugee 
0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.095 
(0.11) 
          -0.069 
(0.13) 
-0.063 
(0.18) 
Log. Battle-
Rel. Deaths 
  0.007 
(0.08) 
-0.144* 
(0.08) 
        0.019 
(0.12) 
-0.077 
(0.15) 
Conflict 
Duration 
    0.064 
(0.07) 
-0.038 
(0.07) 
      0.113 
(0.08) 
0.101 
(0.09) 
Spike 
(1=Spike) 
      0.160 
(0.62) 
-0.542 
(0.73) 
    0.451 
(0.86) 
0.634 
(0.80) 
First PKO 
(1=First) 
        -0.970 
(0.72) 
-2.071** 
(0.78) 
  -1.508 
(1.01) 
-2.891** 
(1.18) 
Logged 
Population 
          -0.545 
(0.50) 
-0.910 
(0.64) 
-0.570 
(0.53) 
-0.517 
(0.78) 
Logged Area           0.463* 
(0.23) 
0.252 
(0.31) 
0.235 
(0.27) 
-0.152 
(0.37) 
Constant 7.047*** 
(1.05) 
6.433*** 
(1.18) 
7.050*** 
(0.42) 
6.186*** 
(0.48) 
6.893*** 
(0.32) 
5.493*** 
(0.40) 
7.021*** 
(0.38) 
5.604*** 
(0.42) 
7.903*** 
(0.63) 
7.116*** 
(0.68) 
6.270* 
(3.47) 
10.495** 
(4.53) 
10.637** 
(4.56) 
14.808** 
(5.80) 
R-squared 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.043 0.021 0.006 0.001 0.012 0.029 0.097 0.057 0.054 0.139 0.180 
N. of cases 48.000 48.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 50.000 45.000 45.000 44.000 44.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Other variables in Table 7, which are refugee population, conflict duration, 
and an occurrence of spike in battle-related deaths predict lower total personnel 
contribution, but these are not statistically significant. For hypothesis 20, which 
proposes higher participation rates related to the increase in population and area of the 
recipient country, we find insignificant evidence that while the increase in population 
indicates lower contribution rates, the increase in area of the recipient country 
responds to higher contribution rates. 
There is only one significant result in Table 7 for the bivariate and multiple 
regression analyses on authorized personnel numbers. As expected, increase of the 
recipient country‟s area corresponds to the increase in authorized personnel at the 
10% significance level. If the area of the recipient country increases by one percent, 
we expect authorized personnel to increase by 0.005 personnel. So, we find partial 
significant support for hypothesis 19, which expects higher mandate requirements for 
recipient countries with a greater population and area. Although authorized personnel 
number increases with the increase in the area of the recipient country, the increase in 
population of the recipient country insignificantly indicates a less authorized 
personnel number. Therefore, we can argue that while deciding the authorized 
personnel number for peacekeeping operations, compared to the population of the 
recipient countries, the UN prioritizes and decides according to the size of the 
recipient countries. 
 We do not find a significant effect for refugee population and conflict 
duration, and spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country. However, we find 
some evidence that while these predictor variables increase the authorized personnel 
number, they also correspond to a decrease in total personnel contribution. We 
therefore see that only the area of the recipient country significantly increases the 
UN‟s decisions in authorized personnel numbers. 
In sum, what we can surely estimate out of these results on participation rates 
is that, firstly established UN peacekeeping operations receive less contribution than 
the follow-up operations, and this does not support hypothesis 21. For fulfilled 
mandate percentages, long-standing conflicts receive less contribution, and this result 
is contrary to hypothesis 12, which proposes higher participation rates in long-
standing conflicts. For total personnel contribution, higher battle-related deaths 
correspond to smaller contributions, and in line with the previous findings, while this 
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result supports hypothesis 9b, it does not support hypothesis 9a. Lastly, authorized 
personnel numbers are significantly related to the size of the recipient country.  
 Until now, we tested our hypotheses on participation by measuring 
participation rates through fulfilled mandate percentages, and individual contribution 
levels on troop and all personnel types. Now, we will test democratic countries‟ 
contribution levels as well. As mentioned above, democracies are more likely to 
participate in peacekeeping operations due to the democratic leaders‟ belief that 
humanitarian objectives are inalienable from self-interest (Bellamy and Williams, 
2013; Lebovic, 2004). Therefore, we will first present our bar graphs of total 
personnel contribution divided to regime types. Then, by interacting democracy with 
our participation predictor variables, we will test the Liberal arguments of 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Bar graph of total personnel contribution divided to regime types. 
 
Figure 2 shows the bar graph of total personnel contribution divided to regime 
types of democracy, mixed regime, and autocracy. Clearly, when the total personnel 
contributions to all the fifty peacekeeping operations are calculated, democracies 
 47 
contributed more personnel than non-democracies, and autocracies are the least 
personnel contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations.  
Table 8 shows the regression analyses of troop contribution. Just like in the 
previous regression analyses, democratic countries contribute significantly at the %1 
level, and therefore we find robust support for hypothesis 6. Different than the 
previous regression analyses, model (5) indicates a significant increase in contribution 
rates in the case of a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient country with a 5% 
significance level. If there is a spike in deaths, we expect a six percent increase in 
troop contribution.  
For the interaction terms of democracies and predictor variables, only conflict 
duration and distance variables provide statistically significant results. Contrary to 
hypothesis 12, in model (4), with the increase in conflict duration, democratic 
countries‟ contribution rates decrease at the 5% significance level, and this is in line 
with the earlier findings in longer conflicts receiving lower fulfilled mandate 
percentages. In model (6), an increase in distance lowers the contribution at the 1% 
level, and the same observation applies for democratic countries‟ contribution rates as 
well.  
 In Table 8, we do not find significant effects for the interaction terms of 
democracies and refugees, battle-related deaths, and spike in deaths at the recipient 
country. With the positive coefficients in refugee and spike in deaths, we find some 
support for hypothesis 5, and 15a. We also find some support for hypothesis 9b, with 
the negative but statistically insignificant coefficient variable. 
Table 9 shows the results of regression analyses that have the same variables 
as Table 8 but with total personnel contribution as the dependent variable. We once 
more see that democratic countries‟ contribution rates are significantly high at the 1% 
significance level. In model (4), with longer conflicts, democratic countries‟ 
contribution rates with respect to all personnel types decrease at the 1% significance 
level. Furthermore, model (6) indicates another robust support to hypothesis 17, in 
which farther recipient countries receive less contribution from all of the contributor 
countries, including the democratic ones. 
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Table 8 
OLS Analysis of Democratic Countries’ Troop Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Troop Contribution 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Democracy (1=Dem.) 0.096*** 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.08) 
0.181** 
(0.09) 
0.128*** 
(0.02) 
0.086*** 
(0.02) 
0.796*** 
(0.19) 
Logged Refugee  -0.009* 
(0.00) 
    
Democracy # L. Refugee  0.008 
(0.01) 
    
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths   -0.011 
(0.01) 
   
Democracy # L. BRD   -0.011 
(0.01) 
   
Conflict duration    -0.001 
(0.00) 
  
Democracy # Conf. Duration    -0.009** 
(0.00) 
  
Spike (1=Spike)     0.061** 
(0.03) 
 
Democracy # Spike     0.024 
(0.04) 
 
Logged Distance      -0.067*** 
(0.02) 
Democracy # L. Distance      -0.080*** 
(0.02) 
Constant 0.100*** 
(0.01) 
0.201*** 
(0.06) 
0.178*** 
(0.06) 
0.104*** 
(0.02) 
0.078*** 
(0.02) 
0.666*** 
(0.13) 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.018 
N. of cases 8035.000 7713.000 6106.000 8035.000 8035.000 7210.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 9 
OLS Analysis of Democratic Countries’ Total Personnel Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Personnel Contribution 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Democracy (1=Dem.) 0.169*** 
(0.02) 
0.151 
(0.09) 
0.263** 
(0.11) 
0.229*** 
(0.03) 
0.176*** 
(0.03) 
1.324*** 
(0.23) 
Logged Refugee  -0.006 
(0.01) 
    
Democracy # L. Refugee  0.001 
(0.01) 
    
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths   -0.012 
(0.01) 
   
Democracy # L. BRD   -0.013 
(0.01) 
   
Conflict duration    0.000 
(0.00) 
  
Democracy # Conf. Duration    -0.018*** 
(0.00) 
  
Spike (1=Spike)     0.003 
(0.03) 
 
Democracy # Spike     -0.017 
(0.05) 
 
Logged Distance      -0.096*** 
(0.02) 
Democracy # L. Distance      -0.133*** 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.196*** 
(0.01) 
0.271*** 
(0.07) 
0.277*** 
(0.08) 
0.196*** 
(0.02) 
0.195*** 
(0.02) 
0.998*** 
(0.16) 
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.029 
N. of cases 8035.000 7713.000 6106.000 8035.000 8035.000 7210.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
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We do not find significant effects for the other predictor variables in Table 9. 
Different than Table 8, in Table 9, we find some support for hypothesis 15b, but the 
estimate is not statistically significant. Other insignificant results in Table 9 indicate 
different sizes but same directions for coefficient observations as in Table 8. 
Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of troop contribution and distance. In Tables 8 
and 9, and Figure 3, we see that not only democracies are sensitive to distance, but all 
the participant countries are contributing significantly less at the 1% significance level 
when the distance between contributor and recipient countries gets longer. 
Furthermore, compared to troop contribution, total personnel contribution is getting 
even less contribution with a larger negative coefficient variable. Thus, we find robust 
support for hypothesis 17, which states that geographically proximal countries are 
more likely to participate in the initial deployment. 
 
 
Figure 3: Scatterplot of troop contribution and distance. 
 
Since geographically proximal countries are more likely to participate in the 
initial UN peacekeeping operations‟ forces, as stated in hypothesis 18, we expect 
regions‟ democratic compositions to reflect the UN peacekeeping operations‟ 
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contributions. In order to measure peacekeeping operations‟ democratic compositions 
specifically for each operation, we divided democracies‟ total personnel contributions 
by the total personnel contributions for every mission, and the result of this division 
equals to the percentage of personnel only from democracies. We chose total 
personnel contribution instead of a certain type of personnel because of two reasons. 
First, since the notion of total personnel contribution includes all types of personnel, 
we avoid any region-wise bias that may arise by choosing a certain type of personnel. 
For instance, military observers are mainly deployed to Europe. Secondly, all 
personnel types are not requested to every operation. For example, out of fifty UN 
peacekeeping operations, there are only thirty-three operations with troop contribution 
and twenty-two with police contribution. Therefore, we take into account all the fifty 
peacekeeping operations at hand by analyzing total personnel contribution.  
There is a minor deficiency in our way of measuring the democratic 
compositions of the UN peacekeeping operations through taking the ratio of the total 
personnel contribution by democracies. There are operations with very few initial 
contributions, and these operations are seen as having a full percent if only 
democracies sent that personnel. For example, there are five UN peacekeeping 
operations that initially received less than ten personnel, and while three of these 
operations received all the personnel from democracies, the other two operations 
received half of the personnel from democracies.  
Figure 4 is a scatterplot of total personnel contribution percentages of 
democratic countries per mission and regions‟ democracy score averages as an 
indicator of regions‟ democratic compositions. Figure 4 does not clearly show 
evidence that regions‟ democratic compositions reflect UN peacekeeping operations‟ 
contributions. Instead, this figure indicates that both democratic and non-democratic 
countries contributed personnel without differentiating between regions‟ democratic 
compositions. In spite of this fact, in regions with higher democracy score averages 
(i.e. from five to ten), it is evident that democracies take the lead in personnel 
contribution. On the other part of the graph though, UN peacekeeping operations that 
are established at regions with lower democracy score averages (i.e. lower than five) 
receive contributions from a wide range of democracy levels. Overall, we see from 
Figure 4 that both democratic and non-democratic countries participated in all 
regions, but the democratic countries overwhelmingly participated more than non-
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democracies in UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, we cannot claim that UN 
peacekeeping operations‟ initial contributions reflect regions‟ democratic 
compositions.   
 
 
Figure 4: Scatterplot of democratic countries’ total personnel contribution 
percentages and regions’ democracy score averages. 
 
 
 
5.3. The Effect of the Brahimi Report 
 
 
 
 In 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the 
Brahimi Report, was conducted to provide suggestions for further developments in 
UN peace operations. Some of the suggestions are on effective and rapid deployment, 
and clearer mandates (Bellamy et al., 2010). In this section, we will test whether the 
UN peacekeeping operations have improved after the Brahimi Report. In order to 
avoid confusions, it has to be kept in mind that pre-2000 period covers the period 
from 1990 to 2000, and post-2000 period covers the years after 2000. 
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First, as stated in hypothesis 22, we will test if the UN peacekeeping 
operations after the Brahimi Report have been more rapidly deployed or not. Figure 5 
shows the before and after 2000 means of duration between suggestion and resolution, 
resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment. Contrary to our 
expectations, post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations are formed and deployed slower 
than pre-2000 operations. While there is a tiny difference between before and after 
2000 bars of delay between resolution and deployment, there is a huge difference 
between bars of delay between suggestion and resolution. Overall though, resolutions 
are formed within a month after the suggestion, and deployments take much longer 
time compared to forming resolutions. 
It has to be noted that, although the durations increase in the post-2000 period, 
post-2000 duration between suggestion and deployment bar seems slightly higher 
than the before 2000 bar, and this is due to United Nations Mission in South Sudan‟s 
(UNMISS) missing information on its duration between suggestion and resolution. 
That case is not included in duration between suggestion and resolution, and 
suggestion and deployment.  
 
 
Figure 5: Bar graph of pre- and post-2000 means of duration between suggestion and 
resolution, resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment. 
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Table 10 
OLS Analysis of Delays and Fulfilled Mandate Percentages 
 
 Delay S-R Delay R-D Delay S-D Mandate 
Spike (1=Spike) -0.617 
(0.44) 
-0.980 
(0.88) 
-2.394** 
(1.18) 
0.024 
(0.25) 
Log. Battle-Rel. Deaths 0.121 
(0.08) 
0.191 
(0.12) 
0.390** 
(0.17) 
-0.087 
(0.08) 
Logged Refugee -0.103 
(0.08) 
-0.448* 
(0.23) 
-0.612*** 
(0.22) 
0.024 
(0.05) 
Year 2000 -0.319 
(1.60) 
-5.485* 
(2.91) 
-8.798** 
(3.36) 
-0.312 
(0.72) 
Spike # Year 2000 0.310 
(0.66) 
-0.120 
(1.41) 
1.032 
(1.41) 
-0.361 
(0.32) 
Log. BRD # Year 2000 -0.045 
(0.11) 
0.040 
(0.19) 
-0.171 
(0.23) 
0.066 
(0.08) 
Log. Refugee # Year 2000 0.075 
(0.17) 
0.483* 
(0.27) 
0.837** 
(0.33) 
-0.006 
(0.06) 
Constant 1.211 
(0.77) 
5.746** 
(2.79) 
7.890*** 
(2.71) 
0.840 
(0.67) 
R-squared 0.180 0.217 0.297 0.102 
N. of cases 47.000 48.000 47.000 48.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
   
 Table 10 shows the multiple regression analyses of delay between suggestion 
and resolution, resolution and deployment, suggestion and deployment, and fulfilled 
mandate percentages with the predictor variables and the interaction variables of the 
dichotomous variable Year 2000 to see the changes in the 21
st
 century. Contrary to the 
results in Figure 5, Table 10 indicates at the 10% and 5% significance levels that 
duration between resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment are 
more likely to be shorter after 2000. In fact, for post-2000 peacekeeping operations, 
durations between resolution and deployment, and suggestion and deployment shorten 
by 5.5 and 8.8 points, holding other variables constant.  
As significant results, an occurrence of spike in battle-related deaths and an 
increase in refugee population at the recipient country shorten the duration between 
suggestion and deployment accordingly at the 5% and 1% significance levels. In line 
with the previous findings, for recipient countries with spikes in deaths, the predicted 
time that takes to form an operation and deploy it would be more than 2 months 
shorter than where there is no spike. If numbers of refugee increase by one percent, 
we expect duration between resolution and deployment to shorten by 0.005 months, 
and duration between suggestion and deployment shorten by 0.006 months. 
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Furthermore, increase in battle-related deaths at the recipient country prolongs the 
duration between suggestion and deployment at the 5% significance level. If battle-
related deaths increase by one percent, we expect delay between suggestion and 
deployment to increase by 0.004 months. When Year 2000 interaction terms are 
analyzed, we see that after 2000, increase in refugee population are more likely to 
prolong the time between both resolution and deployment, and suggestion and 
deployment accordingly at the 10% and 5% significance levels. Unfortunately, other 
variables do not provide a significant result. 
With the Brahimi Report‟s suggestion in rapid and effective deployment, and 
clearer mandate requirements, we also posed hypothesis 23 in order to test if post-
Brahimi Report UN peacekeeping operations are better at reaching initial mandates‟ 
requirements with the initial deployments. However, in Table 10, we could not find 
any significant result.   
As seen in Figure 6, we then did a bar graph of before and after 2000 means of 
UN peacekeeping operations‟ fulfilled mandate percentages. It is clearly evident that 
the UN peacekeeping operations in the post-2000 period witness a decline in fulfilled 
mandate percentages. 
We did another bar graph that specified UN peacekeeping operations‟ fulfilled 
mandate percentages for regions with comparing the two periods. Figure 7 needs 
some explanation. First of all, with the fifty peacekeeping operation cases at hand, 
compared to the thirty-four UN peacekeeping operations that were established in 
between the 1990-2000 time period, post-2000 period witnesses only sixteen newly 
established UN peacekeeping operations. So, UN peacekeeping operations that are 
established in the post-2000 period are as much as half of the ones established in 
between 1990-2000. 
Secondly, not all regions have several UN peacekeeping operations in both 
periods. While there is not any UN peacekeeping operation in Europe after 2000, 
there is only one UN peacekeeping operation in the Americas region after 2000. 
Interestingly, most of the pre-2000 UN peacekeeping operations in the Americas 
region were close to reaching the initial mandate requirements, and one of these 
operations, which is the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) that 
was established in 1997, even quadrupled the requirements. However, established in 
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Figure 6: Bar graph of pre- and post-2000 means of UN peacekeeping operations’ 
fulfilled mandate percentages. 
 
 
Figure 7: Bar graph of pre- and post-2000 means of UN peacekeeping operations’ 
fulfilled mandate percentages specified for regions.  
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2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as the fifth 
mission in Haiti and the only mission in the Americas region for the post-2000 period, 
could barely reach three percent of the mandate requirements at the initial 
deployment. Also, as another region that has few UN peacekeeping operations, the 
Middle East region has one UN peacekeeping operation for each period. 
So, although Americas and Middle East regions‟ UN peacekeeping 
operations‟ fulfilled mandate percentages have decreased in the 21st century, Africa 
and Asia and the Pacific regions‟ fulfilled mandate percentages have increased. No 
matter the increase in fulfilled mandate percentages of two of the regions, and the 
decrease in number of established UN peacekeeping operations in the 21
st
 century, 
there is an overall decrease in fulfilled mandate percentages of the post-Brahimi 
Report UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore, we find evidence against hypothesis 
23, and it seems like the recently established UN peacekeeping operations are faced 
with a slowly diminishing support.  
 Which democracy levels declined their contributions to the UN peacekeeping 
operations in the post-2000 period? Can there be a shift in the nature of UN troop 
contributing countries in the post-2000 period? As the Brahimi Report (2000) states, 
post-2000 peacekeeping operations are mostly contributed by developing countries. 
As our last hypothesis, we propose that the nature of UN troop contributing countries 
shifted in the 21
st
 century with respect to receiving initial deployments more from 
democratic to non-democratic countries.  
 First, we test our hypothesis with a bar graph that shows the non-democratic 
countries‟ means of troop contribution percentages differentiated to before and after 
2000. We measure non-democracies‟ troop contribution percentages by getting a 
percentage of the total troop contributions by non-democracies in the initial 
deployment for every mission. Figure 8 shows the means of these contribution 
percentages for both periods. As seen in this bar graph, democratic countries used to 
contribute more than the non-democratic ones in the 1990-2000 period. However, in 
the 21
st
 century, non-democratic countries‟ troop contribution percentages have risen, 
and they are contributing more than democratic countries. Hence, Figure 8 signifies 
the declining contributions from democratic countries in the post-2000 period. 
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Figure 8: Bar graph of means of non-democracies’ troop contribution percentages 
divided to pre- and post-2000.  
 
 Secondly, we test our last hypothesis with multiple regression analyses of 
logged troop contribution and logged total personnel contribution. Table 11 provides 
significant results. First, as repeatedly seen in other tables as well, democratic 
countries‟ significant effect in increasing the troop contribution rates is once more 
undeniable at the 1% significance level. In fact, we expect democracies to increase 
contributions by thirteen percent, holding all other variables constant. Secondly, as 
robust findings, both troop and total personnel contribution rates increase in the post-
2000 period at the 1% significance level. Post-2000 peacekeeping operations are 
expected to receive eleven percent and thirty percent increase accordingly in troop 
and total personnel contributions while holding other variables constant. Lastly, we 
find robust support for hypothesis 24, in which the interaction term of Democracy and 
Year 2000 show that democratic countries‟ troop contributions have declined in the 
post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations.  
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Table 11 
OLS Analysis of Troop and Total Personnel Contribution 
 
 Log. Troop Cont. Log. Total Pers. Cont. 
Democracy (1=Dem.) 0.130*** 
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(0.06) 
Year 2000 0.110*** 
(0.03) 
0.308*** 
(0.09) 
Democracy # Y. 2000        -0.112*** 
(0.04) 
0.102 
(0.13) 
Constant 0.067*** 
(0.01) 
5.251*** 
(0.04) 
R-squared 0.006 0.005 
N. of cases 8035.000 8035.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
 It seems as if Table 11 and Figure 6 indicate contradictory results. Table 11 
shows that troop and total personnel contributions have increased in the 21
st
 century, 
but Figure 6 suggests that the fulfilled mandate percentages of the post-2000 UN 
peacekeeping operations have decreased. It has to be noted at this point that, while 
sixteen post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations have a mean of 7965 authorized 
personnel and 3012 initial total personnel contribution, the period between 1990-2000 
has witnessed thirty-four UN peacekeeping operations with a mean of 3527 
authorized personnel and 1263 initial total personnel contribution. If the proportions 
of contributed personnel to authorized personnel are calculated, it is seen that the 
post-2000 peacekeeping operations‟ contributions comprises a bigger ratio than the 
pre-2000 operations. As a result, compared to the peacekeeping operations of the 
previous era, 21
st
 century UN peacekeeping operations have indeed transformed into 
more complex operations, and consequently these peacekeeping operations require 
more contributions with a broad spectrum of goals to achieve.  
In addition, we know from Figure 8 that non-democratic countries‟ 
contribution rates passed democracies‟ contributions in the post-2000 period, and we 
also see in Table 11 that all contribution types increased in the last decade. So, we can 
clearly estimate that non-democratic countries‟ contributions in the post-2000 period 
overpassed democratic countries‟ contributions from the 1990-2000 period. All of 
these results provide a potential future vision on by whom the UN peacekeeping 
operations are more likely to be contributed by, and how these operations are 
becoming even more complex. 
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5.4. Potential Areas for Future Research 
 
 
 
The UN peacekeeping operations have many interrelated factors that cannot 
be quantitatively tested at this thesis. In addition, we cannot explain some of the 
results or irregularities that we encounter without in-depth case studies. Therefore, we 
want to mention some of the potential future research topics that will contribute 
highly to the peacekeeping literature.  
As the main argument of this research, we believe that the promptly and 
readily deployed initial forces will establish credibility of the operation, and thereby 
increase the likelihood of achieving a stable peace. For that reason, we aimed on 
revealing the trends in initial contribution numbers and initial deployment speeds to 
the UN peacekeeping operations. As a highly important potential research topic, we 
should determine the deployment speeds‟ relationship with the success rates of the 
UN peacekeeping operations.  
Secondly, we cannot thoroughly explain why follow-up peacekeeping 
operations‟ fulfilled mandate percentages are higher than the first ones. This might be 
due to the know-how aspect. However, for further improvements, these operations 
can be studied as case studies. Thirdly, we could not find a clear result for democratic 
and non-democratic countries‟ deployment speeds. Likewise, applying case studies 
can reveal these democracy levels‟ trends in deployment speeds.  
Interestingly, although recipient countries with fuel exports receive lower 
contribution rates, we find that the UN peacekeeping operations established at former 
colonies receive higher total personnel contributions from all the countries. This issue 
is another finding that we cannot explain.  
Lastly, we argued that regions‟ democratic compositions reflect UN 
peacekeeping operations‟ contributions, but we could not find a clear correlation 
between regions‟ democracy score averages and peacekeeping operations‟ democratic 
compositions. This issue can be studied in future studies by including all the 
contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations.  
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The main difference between Realist and Liberal arguments of the 
peacekeeping operations is their different explanations for the countries‟ incentives in 
contributing to the operations. Fundamentally, these theories depart at the question of 
why countries contribute to peacekeeping operations. On the one hand, the Realists 
propose that contributor countries see contribution to the peacekeeping operations as 
an opportunity; on the other hand, the Liberals suggest that countries contribute 
because they are willing to. For now, we cannot give a certain answer to this 
fundamental question. 
For instance, we cannot explain the increase in troop contribution of non-
democracies to the 21
st
 century peacekeeping operations. As Bellamy and Williams 
(2013) note, top contributors to the 21
st
 century peacekeeping operations are all poor 
countries, such as Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, and in fact, most of the top ten 
contributor countries to the recent operations are faced with internal conflicts 
themselves. Also, Bellamy and Williams (2013) note that the top contributors‟ 
personnel are frequently untrained and insufficiently equipped, and the contributor 
countries receive financial rewards for their participation. So, rather than states 
contributing for financial rewards the UN provides, it might be the fact that poor and 
internally conflicting countries are sending poorly trained and equipped personnel in 
order to reduce the financial burden these personnel create to the national accounts. 
The relationship between countries that are experiencing internal conflicts and their 
personnel contributions is another potential future research topic that might unveil 
some inner processes to the UN peacekeeping operations.  
In sum, previous theories largely rely on several factors, but in fact, there are a 
lot more interrelated factors that cannot be explained within a single study, or a 
theory. These factors range from domestic interests to global factors. Although we are 
aware of the existence of such factors, here, we tried to provide a general framework 
of the trends in contributions and deployment speeds to the UN peacekeeping 
operations.  
Next section will be on conclusion where we will sum up all the significant 
results, and present our interpretations on how all of these results will provide future 
knowledge on UN peacekeeping operations. In the meantime, we will offer ways for 
the future studies to improve the notions of what this thesis introduced to the 
peacekeeping literature. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
This thesis offers the first systematic analysis of deployment and resolution 
speeds, and initial contribution levels of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
In order to present the relations of these variables, we did ordinary least squares 
regression analyses with predictor variables that included both new and previously 
studied ones in the literature.  
 For the Realist-inspired arguments of the peacekeeping operations, we find 
that both Permanent-5 and democratic countries contribute highly significantly in the 
initial deployments with all personnel types. However, neither Permanent-5 members 
nor democratic countries participate more where there is a self-interest situation, 
which is measured by the recipient country being a former colony or having fuel 
exports. Interestingly, while all countries‟ participation rates are lower to the recipient 
countries with fuel exports, total personnel contribution rates to the former colonies 
are high. Also, in order to measure the international security threat‟s impact on our 
variables of speed and contribution, we looked at our variables‟ relations with the 
refugee population of the recipient country. We find that recipient countries with large 
numbers of refugees are more likely to receive quicker deployments. However, we 
could not find any significant result for the other variables. 
 We then proceeded with our hypotheses on Liberal accounts of the 
peacekeeping operations. We first checked the fundamental argument of Liberal 
account by testing democratic countries‟ contribution rates in the initially deployed 
forces and we argued that democratic countries would contribute more than non-
democratic ones. As a completely new addition to the previous studies, we also tested 
democracies‟ and non-democracies‟ deployment promptness. We argued that 
democratic countries would deploy slower than non-democracies due to the advanced 
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democracies‟ complex mechanisms in decision-making processes. We significantly 
find that democratic countries initially contribute more than non-democracies, but we 
could not reach a significant finding for their deployment rates.  
 Secondly, we tested the conflict intensity‟s effect on our variables of 
deployment and resolution speeds, and initial contribution levels. We find that 
recipient countries with higher battle-related deaths are more likely to receive slower 
formed resolutions and slower initial deployments with lower participation rates. If 
the intervened conflict is long-standing at the recipient country, then participation to 
the peacekeeping operation is likely to be low. Surprisingly, with our new measure to 
the peacekeeping literature, if there is a spike in battle-related deaths at the recipient 
country, we find that the deployment is likely to be fast and the troop contributions 
are likely to be more.  
 As Bellamy and Williams (2013) state, one of the main reasons for 
democracies‟ incentives on providing peacekeepers is due to the belief of democratic 
leaders that democratic practices can be exported and humanitarian objectives can be 
pursued. A part of our results however provide a counter-argument to the Liberal 
account of the peacekeeping operations. If the UN and the contributing countries have 
acted accordingly with the proposed belief, then the recipient countries with high 
battle-related deaths would receive quicker resolutions, prompt deployments and 
higher participation rates. Slowly formed resolutions can be explained by the UN‟s 
careful decision-making process in a serious conflict. However, low initial 
participation rates directly suggests that the costs of sending troops are higher than the 
advantages of sending troops, which clearly means that the participating countries are 
afraid to lose their citizens.  
 Albeit these facts, we cannot strictly oppose the arguments of the Liberal 
account and the rooted belief in humanitarian objectives of the UN peacekeeping 
operations. Although the total of battle-related deaths spread over a time period may 
not accelerate the deployments or increase the participation rates, a sudden rise in 
battle-related deaths may indeed speed up the forces‟ deployments and increase the 
initial participation rates. Hence, conflict duration and battle-related deaths of a 
conflict spread over years may not seem that much urgent to both the UN and the 
participating countries, but a sudden increase in deaths evidently creates a 
humanitarian crisis and consequently creates higher initial participation rates coupled 
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with a prompt deployment. Therefore, we believe we find support for the Liberal 
account of peacekeeping operations with our new measure of spike in battle-related 
deaths.   
 We also tested what is significant for the UN in preparing mandate 
requirements by including all the independent variables that we looked at. We 
significantly find that increase of the recipient country‟s area corresponds to an 
increase in authorized personnel number. However, we could not find any significant 
result for the authorized personnel number‟s relations with population, battle-related 
deaths, conflict duration, refugee population, and spike in battle-related deaths. So, 
these results solely indicate that the UN prioritizes and decides according to the size 
of the recipient countries in order to increase the forces‟ ability in covering the whole 
range of the country.  
 We tested the effect of the peacekeeping operation being the first to be 
established or a follow-up one with several peacekeeping operations established for 
the same conflict at the same recipient country. We find that follow-up peacekeeping 
operations‟ fulfilled mandate percentages are more than the first peacekeeping 
operations, and this may be due to the know-how aspect of the follow-up operations. 
As a possible future research topic, we believe that successful first peacekeeping 
operations‟ follow-up operations may receive more contributions, but the first 
peacekeeping operations that were terminated with unsuccessful results may receive 
fewer contributions in their follow-up missions. 
We also tested geographical proximity‟s effect on contribution levels. We find 
that all the countries are sensitive to distance, meaning that the proximate countries 
participate highly at the initially deployed forces with a fear of potential spillover, and 
accordingly, contribution to the peacekeeping operations decreases with the increase 
in distance between contributor and recipient countries. With this expected finding on 
the effect of distance on contribution rates, we argued that regions‟ democratic 
compositions would reflect UN peacekeeping operations‟ contributions. Although we 
could not find a clear positive correlation between regions‟ democracy score averages 
and peacekeeping operations‟ democratic compositions that are measured through 
taking the ratio of the total personnel contribution by democracies, we reached 
interesting findings. It is seen that both democratic and non-democratic countries 
contributed personnel without differentiating between regions‟ democratic 
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compositions. While democracies evidently participated more than non-democracies 
to the operations that are at regions with high democracy score averages, democracies 
also participated high in lower democracy score averaged regions as well. Therefore, 
we cannot claim that the regions‟ democratic compositions reflect UN peacekeeping 
operations‟ initial contributions. This issue can be studied in future studies by 
including all the contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations. 
 As the last topic of this thesis, we tested what has changed after the Brahimi 
Report (2000). Although the bar graphs of before and after 2000 means indicate 
slower forming of resolutions and deployments in the post-2000 period, the regression 
analyses indicate that it is more likely for the resolutions to form and initial forces to 
deploy faster in the 21
st
 century compared to the 1990-2000 period.  
 We also tested the change in post-2000 contribution rates with two measures 
of fulfilled mandate percentages and individual contributions of two democracy levels 
differentiated as democracy and non-democracy. The regression analysis on fulfilled 
mandate percentages has not resulted with a significant finding, but the bar graph 
clearly shows that the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations lack the required 
contribution levels with a steep decline in fulfilled mandate percentages.  
 Lastly, we checked if the nature of troop contributing countries has changed in 
the 21
st
 century for the initial deployments. The regression analyses and bar graphs 
clearly indicate that democratic countries‟ contribution rates decreased and non-
democratic countries are contributing more troops than the democratic countries in the 
post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations. We also find that both troop and total 
personnel contribution increased in the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations. 
 It seems as if we encountered contradictory results with two facts of decreased 
fulfilled mandate percentages and increased contribution rates, but these results 
should be interpreted before reaching any conclusions. First of all, for our cases at 
hand, the post-2000 period witnessed sixteen UN peacekeeping operations until now, 
which is as much as half of the thirty-four operations in the 1990-2000 period. When 
these periods‟ proportions of contributed personnel numbers to authorized personnel 
numbers are calculated, then we clearly see that the post-2000 UN peacekeeping 
operations‟ contributions comprise a bigger ratio of the authorized personnel 
numbers. As a result, as Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010) argue, the increase in 
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authorized and contributed personnel numbers indicate that compared to the 
peacekeeping operations of the previous era, 21
st
 century UN peacekeeping operations 
have included more complex operations by mostly applying multidimensional 
peacekeeping rather than traditional peacekeeping, and consequently these operations 
require more contributions with a wide array of goals to achieve. The Brahimi Report 
indeed changed the vision of the UN peacekeeping operations. 
 This thesis provides an optimistic potential future vision for the UN 
peacekeeping operations by analyzing how the UN and the contributor countries 
reacted to certain variables, and what has changed after the Brahimi Report. We learn 
that the post-2000 UN peacekeeping operations are more likely to receive faster 
formed resolutions and increased initial contributions mainly from non-democratic 
countries with prompt deployments. Also, although democratic countries are inclined 
to participate highly in peacekeeping operations that are at regions with high 
democracy score averages, both democracies and non-democracies are participating at 
every region without differentiating between their democratic compositions.  
When we test the main arguments on peacekeeping operations, we come 
across interesting results. We see that self-interest situation is not associated with 
higher contribution rates or quicker deployments. However, international security 
threat with large numbers of refugees is associated with prompt deployments. For the 
Liberal arguments of peacekeeping operations though, we see that a spike in battle-
related deaths creates a humanitarian crisis, and the contributor countries 
consequently respond to the humanitarian crisis in an urgent manner with higher 
contribution rates and prompt deployments. However, since total amount of battle-
related deaths spread over a time period do not alert the UN and the contributor 
countries, the costs of sending troops are higher than the advantages, and therefore we 
see less contribution rates and slower deployments in the case of high battle-related 
deaths and long conflicts at the recipient countries. So, we find some evidence to both 
Realist and Liberal accounts of peacekeeping operations. In sum, if a country in 
conflict experiences a spike in deaths, and creates an international security threat with 
a potential spillover, both geographically proximate and other countries are more 
likely to participate more personnel with a prompt deployment. Basically, what we 
can interpret for the countries‟ contribution characteristics is that countries contribute 
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at a minimum level or do not contribute at all if the conflict does not need an urgent 
intervention or if the conflict does not threaten its security. 
 Prompt deployments, in addition to Hultman, Kahtman, and Shannon‟s (2013) 
arguments on deploying large number of personnel, certainly signals credible 
commitment, and with the UN‟s seen willingness in maintaining peace and security in 
the post-civil war period through these two aspects, the UN peacekeeping operations 
pave the way for a stable peace. In short, we expect quicker and more readily 
deployed forces in the newly established UN peacekeeping operations, and we believe 
that the complexity of the 21
st
 century multidimensional peacekeeping operations will 
lead to more successful and efficient operations with more committed goals that range 
from humanitarian causes to facilitating political process.  
Since the initial deployments‟ promptness and readiness with the necessary 
contribution rates is argued to be vital for the signal of the UN peacekeeping 
operations‟ commitments in their goals, further studies can improve the notion of 
deployment speeds by analyzing their relationship with the success rates of the UN 
peacekeeping operations.  
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